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RECASTING THE PROLIFERATION                               
OPTIMISM-PESSIMISM DEBATE 
JEFFREY W. KNOPF 
N MOST COUNTRIES, public and media discussions of the spread of nuclear 
weapons take it for granted that such proliferation is dangerous and unde-
sirable. This consensus is not shared among scholarly security specialists, 
who instead have long debated the likely consequences of nuclear prolifera-
tion.1 A number of prominent realist and rational choice International Rela-
tions scholars have argued, in a position that has been labeled proliferation 
optimism, that there is virtually no risk that nuclear weapons will actually be 
detonated if more countries obtain them. Because optimists also believe that 
nuclear deterrence greatly reduces the probability of major conventional war, 
many even advocate selective proliferation, provided it occurs gradually.2 A 
1981 Adelphi Paper by Kenneth Waltz, whose subtitle suggests more may be 
better, remains the classic exposition of this position.3 
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1. Because the literature on this debate is now quite extensive, I do not include the stan-
dard introductory footnote that cites all the studies. Instead, I refer readers to the very thor-
ough literature review by Peter R. Lavoy, The Strategic Consequences of Nuclear Prolifera-
tion, Security Studies 4, no. 4 (summer 1995): 695753. 
2. For examples involving specific countries, see John J. Mearsheimer, The Case for a 
Ukrainian Nuclear Deterrent, Foreign Affairs 72, no. 3 (summer 1993): 5066; and 
Mearsheimers op-ed, India Needs the Bomb, New York Times, 24 March 2000, A21. 
3. Kenneth N. Waltz, The Spread of Nuclear Weapons: More May Be Better, Adelphi Paper no. 
171 (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies [IISS], 1981). References below that 
list this title are to the Adelphi Paper and not to a later book with the same main title, coau-
thored with Scott Sagan (see n. 5). 
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In response, other scholars have argued there are reasons to anticipate de-
terrence failures and accidents involving nuclear weapons, a position that has 
been labeled proliferation pessimism. A 1994 article by Scott Sagan describ-
ing the perils of proliferation served as an important milestone in the devel-
opment of the pessimist position.4 Waltz and Sagan subsequently published a 
book containing modified versions of their original essays plus rebuttals to 
each others arguments.5 For this reason, the optimism-pessimism debate is 
also often referred to as the Waltz-Sagan debate. 
Most of the contributions to this debate have sought to inform policy, both 
in states that advocate nonproliferation and in states that are potential prolif-
erators.6 Waltzs Adelphi Paper, for example, includes a section laying out the 
implications for American policy, while Sagans Perils article closes with a 
discussion of policy implications.7 Because academic social science is often 
skeptical or openly dismissive of policy-oriented work, the scholars who have 
studied proliferation deserve credit for seeking to address an important policy 
issue. Unfortunately, as an effort to help the international community and po-
tential proliferators make better decisions, the optimism-pessimism debate 
constitutes an inadequate and potentially misleading source of guidance. 
Three conceptual problems reduce the value of the advice offered to poli-
cymakers. First, the debate has increasingly been framed as a contest between 
rival theories. Ascertaining which theory is stronger, however, does not neces-
sarily lead directly to sound policy advice. A theory will be seen as superior if 
its predictions are correct more often than those of its rivals. If, however, even 
a few predictions are wrong, and the outcomes in those cases are major con-
ventional wars or nuclear exchanges, it might not make sense to adopt the pol-
icy recommendation that has been associated with the theory in question. 
Determining which theory is stronger is still a relevant task, but great care 
must be exercised in moving from theory evaluation to the drawing of policy 
inferences. 
 
4. Scott D. Sagan, The Perils of Proliferation: Organization Theory, Deterrence Theory, 
and the Spread of Nuclear Weapons, International Security 18, no. 4 (spring 1994): 66107. 
5. Scott D. Sagan and Kenneth N. Waltz, The Spread of Nuclear Weapons: A Debate (New 
York: Norton, 1995). Sagan and Waltz have updated and expanded their debate in a second 
edition of the book, The Spread of Nuclear Weapons: A Debate Renewed (New York: Norton, 
2003). Unless otherwise noted, references below are to the first edition. Because this book 
has the same primary title as Waltzs earlier Adelphi Paper, references below to either edition 
of the debate book will include the chapter title, since the books format treats these as 
though they are separate articles in an edited volume, and cite the book by the title and subti-
tle of the edition in question. 
6. Scott D. Sagan especially emphasizes the goal of influencing policy debates in potential 
nuclear weapon states. See Responses and Reflections, Security Studies 4, no. 4 (summer 
1995): 80810. 
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Second, the debate has focused on whether the stabilizing or destabilizing 
effects of nuclear weapons are stronger, without devoting as much considera-
tion to what it would mean if both effects can be present to some degree. I will 
argue that nuclear weapons simultaneously have both stabilizing and destabiliz-
ing consequences, and this point has implications regardless of which impact is 
stronger. If nuclear weapons create pressures that push in opposite directions, 
then there is necessarily a trade-off between the possible benefits and the pos-
sible risks of a nuclear deterrent, and sound policy advice must include ac-
knowledgement of this trade-off. 
The need to weigh trade-offs also makes salient a third problem with the 
debate: it is too narrow. The entire literature focuses almost exclusively on the 
question of stability, that is, whether nuclear proliferation will encourage or 
discourage the use of force. This is obviously an important question, and if we 
could predict with certainty that all cases of nuclear proliferation would result 
in nuclear war, that would end the debateno sane person would advocate a 
policy certain to produce such an outcome. It is only because the implications 
of proliferation for the likelihood of war, both nuclear and conventional, are in 
doubt that we have a debate. While stability is clearly one relevant criterion for 
deciding whether or not nuclear proliferation is advisable, it is not the only 
one. Especially because the question is one of weighing trade-offs, the eco-
nomic, environmental, psychological, and domestic political implications of 
obtaining a nuclear arsenal should also be considered. 
As a result of these three conceptual problems, the way the debate is pres-
ently framed makes the pessimist case appear weaker than it actually is. It is 
necessary to recast the debate so that it includes examination of all of the rele-
vant risks and trade-offs. Because the non-stability-related consequences have 
received so little attention in the proliferation debate to date, the greatest por-
tion of this article will address the economic, health and other costs that new 
nuclear weapon states should anticipate. Doing so will also shed new light on 
the stability question, as domestic political and economic impacts of nuclear 
arms programs may adversely affect the prospects for regional stability.8 Re-
casting the optimism-pessimism debate to make it more comprehensive will 
not necessarily suggest that no state should ever seek nuclear arms; where the 
security threat is dire enough, the attractions of a nuclear deterrent will still 
exist. A broader analysis of the costs and benefits, however, will show there are 
more reasons for states to hesitate before trying to join the nuclear club than 
either optimists or pessimists have so far considered, and that continued non-
proliferation efforts still make sense. 
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KEY FEATURES OF THE LITERATURE 
HOUGH THEY reach different conclusions, optimists and pessimists agree 
on the main criteria for judging whether proliferations consequences will 
be negative. They focus on whether deterrence could break down, through any 
of three possible avenues. First, there must not be a preventive attack (conven-
tional or nuclear) during the transition period when a state is developing its 
nuclear arsenal. Second, states must deploy survivable forces capable of retali-
ating in a second strike. This guards against two possible types of deterrence 
failure: second-strike forces ensure states do not need to adopt a launch-on-
warning posture in which a false warning of attack might lead them to fire off 
their weapons, and they eliminate any incentive for the other side to launch a 
preemptive strike during a crisis (that is, they create crisis stability). I will argue 
below, however, that survivable second-strike forces might not be sufficient to 
prevent preemption, so that meeting this criterion does not guarantee the op-
timist prediction will be correct. Finally, third, there must not be accidental or 
unauthorized use of nuclear weapons.9 
These three criteria for evaluating the stability of nuclear deterrence concern 
only potential negative consequences of proliferation. Obviously, if no states 
seek nuclear weapons, then none of these negative scenarios can happen. The 
three criteria address the question of whether these undesirable outcomes can 
also be avoided if nuclear proliferation does occur. Any positive case for pro-
liferation must thus be made separately. 
The initial optimist case was based on a mixture of logical argument and evi-
dence drawn from the U.S.-Soviet cold war experience. Taking the empirical 
side of the debate first, optimists attached great weight to the absence of the 
Third World War, seeing it as a sign that nuclear deterrence had stabilized the 
U.S.-Soviet relationship. Nonproliferation advocates first responded by chal-
lenging the relevance of this case. They argued that important contextual fac-
tors would be different in the regions where future proliferation was most 
likely: shared borders, religious differences, and the fact the states in question 
had fought wars in the recent past would create stiffer challenges for deter-
rence in places like South Asia and the Middle East.10 
Subsequent pessimist studies also reexamined the cold war record. This re-
search uncovered a number of dangerous operational practices, accidents, and 
 
9. Kenneth N. Waltz, More May Be Better, chap. 1 in Sagan and Waltz, The Spread of 
Nuclear Weapons: A Debate, 20, and Scott D. Sagan, More Will Be Worse, chap. 2 in ibid., 
50. 
10. Lewis A. Dunn, Controlling the Bomb (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1982); Karl 
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near misses during the cold war. Pessimists interpreted these incidents as evi-
dence that nuclear war could have occurred, and they argued that future nu-
clear-armed states might not be as lucky.11 In addition, both sides realized it 
would be a mistake to rely on just the U.S.-Soviet case. Thus, a number of stud-
ies have now also examined evidence from other regional relationships where 
one or more states pursued or acquired nuclear weapons.12 
Short of the occurrence of perhaps several nuclear wars, however, the em-
pirical record alone is not likely to settle the debate. Reflecting the adage that 
facts do not speak for themselves, the relevant evidence and appropriate 
inferences from it are themselves matters of dispute. Hence, the contrasting 
logical arguments made by each side are really the heart of the debate. Opti-
mists like Waltz have drawn on the structural realist paradigm to put forward a 
set of propositions others have labeled rational deterrence theory (RDT).13 
Optimists build their case on two broad assertions that are consistent with 
RDT. First, optimists argue that the costs of nuclear war are so enormous and 
so obvious that any leader of any state will strongly seek to avoid any chance 
of suffering such destruction14 (though why this does not become a reason for 
predicting that most states will not want nuclear weapons in the first place is 
not clear15). 
The dread of suffering nuclear devastation has two implications. First, states 
have every incentive16 to meet the three criteria for stability. Because of the 
possible consequences if they do not, they will make sure that they have 
 
11. Bruce G. Blair, The Logic of Accidental Nuclear War (Washington, D.C.: Brookings, 1993); 
Scott D. Sagan, The Limits of Safety: Organizations, Accidents, and Nuclear Weapons (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 1993). 
12. Devin T. Hagerty, The Consequences of Nuclear Proliferation: Lessons from South Asia (Cam-
bridge: Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs and MIT Press, 1998); Mario E. 
Carranza, An Impossible Game: Stable Nuclear Deterrence after the Indian and Pakistani 
Tests, The Nonproliferation Review 6, no. 3 (springsummer 1999): 1124; David J. Karl, 
Does Nuclear Proliferation Really Matter? A Comparative Examination of Nuclear Rivalries 
in East Asia (Ph.D. diss., University of Southern California, 1996); Planning the Unthinkable: 
How New Powers Will Use Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Weapons, ed. Peter R. Lavoy, Scott D. 
Sagan, and James J. Wirtz (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2000). 
13. This theoretical approach predates the proliferation debate. The most influential 
founding work was Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict (Cambridge: Harvard Univer-
sity Press, 1960). 
14. For example, Waltzs Adelphi Paper, The Spread of Nuclear Weapons, contains eight sepa-
rate passages that dwell on the costs that a state would suffer from any use of nuclear weap-
ons against it. See 3, 5, 6, 12, 16, 21, 23, 30. 
15. A recent study has used realist thinking to argue that desire to avoid becoming a nu-
clear target is one reason why a number of technically capable states have exercised nuclear 
restraint. T. V. Paul, Power versus Prudence: Why Nations Forgo Nuclear Weapons (Montreal: 
McGill-Queens University Press, 2000). 
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second-strike forces and that their command and control arrangements are 
adequate to prevent accidents and unauthorized use. 
The second implication of great costs is caution. Optimists argue that states 
will be exceedingly careful not to take actions that risk nuclear war. They will 
not attempt preventive attacks if there is even the remotest chance that the 
other side already possesses a few nuclear weapons. Moreover, states will not 
launch major conventional attacks against a nuclear-armed adversary. Because 
of the risk of escalation to the nuclear level, states will be wary of direct mili-
tary clashes of any kind. This is where optimists get the positive case for pro-
liferation. Once stable nuclear deterrence exists, optimists claim, major con-
ventional war either becomes impossible or at minimum its likelihood is greatly 
reduced. 
As a second broad assertion underpinning their case, optimists contend that 
meeting the three criteria for stability is easy. Nuclear weapons are relatively 
small and can easily be made mobile, meaning that survivable forces can read-
ily be created by moving or hiding weapons.17 Because even a single nuclear 
weapon can cause enormous destruction, effective deterrence will exist if just a 
few of them are survivable. Finally, survivability is in the eye of a potential at-
tacker. If a state is not 100 percent certain that it knows the location of all of 
another sides weapons and that it can successfully destroy all of them, then 
any attack simply becomes too dangerous to consider. In short, in the optimist 
view, a little uncertainty goes a very long way. 
Pessimists agree that states will not intentionally seek to fight a nuclear war. 
They argue, however, that there can be significant slippage between ones in-
tentions and actual outcomes. According to pessimists, a number of interven-
ing factors could lead to deterrence failure. Collectively, pessimists have put 
forward a mixture of situational, organizational, and psychological arguments 
for why states might decide to attack nuclear adversaries or take steps that in-
advertently lead to nuclear use.18 
THE PESSIMISTS TURN TO THEORY 
To make these arguments, proliferation pessimists began in the 1990s to draw 
explicitly on social science theories (leading some to label this new work 
neopessimism). Because, thankfully, there has never been a full-scale war 
 
17. On this point, see esp. Jordan Seng, Less is More: Command and Control Advan-
tages of Minor Nuclear States, Security Studies 6, no. 4 (summer 1997): 5092. 
18. A study that makes use of all three types of argument is James G. Blight and David A. 
Welch, Risking The Destruction of Nations: Lessons of the Cuban Missile Crisis for New 
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between two nuclear-armed states, there is no direct empirical evidence to con-
firm the worst fears of pessimists. To rebut optimism, therefore, pessimists 
must make a case that such past outcomes were partly fortuitous and provide 
compelling logical reasons to expect that future outcomes will not necessarily 
be as benign. The strongest source of such logical arguments is through deduc-
tion from a coherent, well-established theory. 
Thus, in his 1994 article, Sagan noted with respect to previous criticisms of 
the optimist position, What is missing in this literature, however, is an alterna-
tive theory of the consequences of nuclear proliferation. About the same 
time, Peter Feaver also charged that pessimist theory was underdeveloped: 
Waltzs admonition to replace theory with theory is well-taken. Until now, 
much of the nuclear pessimist enterprise has consisted of criticizing Waltzs 
theory without advancing countertheories.19 
Sagan, Feaver and others therefore sought to develop such an alternative. 
They adopted a decisionmaking approach, with particular emphasis on propo-
sitions derived from organization theory. For example, Sagan emphasizes bi-
ases believed to be common in military organizations. Because of these biases, 
Sagan argues, militaries will be inclined to pursue preventive war, and they will 
neglect measures to ensure that nuclear forces are survivable and are safe 
against accidental or unauthorized use.20 Unfortunately, as scholarly attention 
has turned to evaluating the rival theories of optimists and pessimists, certain 
criteria for evaluation have come to the forefront that could lead to misleading 
or inappropriate policy recommendations. 
PROBLEMS WITH FRAMING THE DEBATE AS A THEORY CONTEST 
EVELOPING AND testing theories are core tasks in the social sciences. 
Accordingly, social scientists have established criteria for judging which 
theories are best. When confronted with rival theories about a subject like pro-
liferation, academics naturally turn to these familiar criteria to evaluate which 
of the two contending camps has the better argument. Determining which is 
the better theory, however, does not necessarily tell us what is the best policy; 
any attempt to infer policy lessons from theory tests should be done carefully. 
It makes no sense to test theories in the most rigorous manner possible, only 
to be casual in how one derives policy advice from the results of these tests. 
 
19. Sagan, Perils of Proliferation, 6768 (emphasis in original); Peter D. Feaver, Opti-
mists, Pessimists, and Theories of Nuclear Proliferation Management, Security Studies 4, no. 4 
(summer 1995): 767. 
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Optimists and pessimists have increasingly sought to conform their work to 
standard social science procedures. Faced with two different theories on a 
questionin this case, whether proliferation will lead to stabilityscholars 
tend to treat the two theories as competing alternatives. They therefore pit the 
two theories against each other in a superiority contest,21 where the ultimate 
test is how well each theory matches empirical evidence. If one theorys pre-
dictions are generally confirmed while the others are frequently falsified, there 
will be a natural inclination to favor the policy position associated with the 
stronger theory. This is not always justified, however. Policymakers have to be 
concerned with the incorrect predictions. It is little comfort to be told that a 
theory is far better than its rival if that theory turns out to be wrong in the in-
dividual case you care about. 
Many pessimists have pointed this out when they are simply critiquing the 
optimist position. As Feaver notes: 
At best, rational deterrence theory can predict that nuclear deterrence 
should assure peace most of the time.[I]f RDT could successfully pre-
dict peace 99.5 percent of the time it would therefore miss .5 percent of 
the time. This would qualify for the social science hall of fame, but it 
would not make nuclear proliferation trivial[g]iven the stakes in-
volved.22 
Even some nonpessimists acknowledge this point. Peter Lavoy, in a review 
of the Waltz-Sagan debate that sides with Waltz on many of the issues, none-
theless concludes on a cautionary note: Policymakersmust worry about 
exceptions to the rule.[O]ne exception woulddwarf the significance of the 
theory.Even if Waltz is correct 99 percent of the time, the 1 percent of ex-
ceptional cases is what U.S. policymakers must worry about.23 Richard Betts 
argues that this concern also follows from a classical realist outlook, which he 
takes pains to distinguish from Waltzs neo- or structural realist approach. 
Betts notes further that it is not clear what else might happen once there is 
even a single exception to the prediction of stability and that this is a further 
reason for caution. As he puts it, the ramifications of the first breakage of the 
 
21. In the international relations field, there has been in recent years a backlash against the 
tendency to design research around superiority contests between rival theories. Some schol-
ars are now self-consciously seeking to synthesize or identify complementary relationships 
between theories. Most of the works discussed in this section, however, adopted the ap-
proach that was dominant in the mid-1990s, when they were written. 
22. Peter D. Feaver, Proliferation Optimism and Theories of Nuclear Operations, Secu-
rity Studies 2, nos. 3/4 (spring/summer 1993): 162. 
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half-century taboo on nuclear use are too unpredictable to tempt us to run the 
experiment.24 
Proliferation pessimists, however, do not make this their primary argument. 
Rather, they frame their studies in terms that could convince an academic au-
dience that these studies disprove the arguments of proliferation optimism. In 
effect, this shifts the criteria used to judge the debate. By the norms of social 
science, one does not reject a theory because of a few wrong predictions; it 
takes a better, alternative theory. Pessimists thus do not rest their case on the 
point that one needs to be concerned about exceptions to RDT.25 Instead, in an 
attempt to persuade their academic peers to reject proliferation optimism, the 
pessimists propose alternative theories that predict why nuclear deterrence will 
fail.  
In short, both sides now describe the optimist-pessimist debate as a contest 
between rival theories. As Sagan puts it, I compare the two theories predic-
tionsandpresent the existing empirical evidence; he adds that the heart 
of his disagreement with Waltz is how best to explain and predict the behavior 
of states.26 Feaver has even listed a set of competing hypotheses derived from 
the theoretical core of each camp: rational deterrence theory and a theory 
of decision making, which claims that organizational, psychological, and strate-
gic pathologies will necessarily corrupt RDT expectations. Feaver indicates that 
the theories must be evaluated against the empirical record. To the extent 
that future research supports or undermines these hypotheses, the opti-
mist/pessimist [debate] can be resolved.27 
In practice under this framing, proliferation optimists have been able to 
claim their position is the stronger one. Recent research has, quite appropri-
ately, turned to the experiences of countries that pursued nuclear weapons 
programs subsequent to the first generation of nuclear weapon states. After 
examining these cases, several studies have concluded that the rational deter-
rence theory of optimists receives more support than the decisionmaking the-





24. Richard K. Betts, Universal Deterrence or Conceptual Collapse? Liberal Pessimism 
and Utopian Realism, in The Coming Crisis: Nuclear Proliferation, U.S. Interests, and World Order, 
ed. Victor A. Utgoff (Cambridge: MIT Press, 2000), 6566; see also 52. 
25. Betts, ibid., is an exception. 
26. Sagan, More Will Be Worse, 50, and Sagan Responds to Waltz, chap. 4 of Sagan 
and Waltz, The Spread of Nuclear Weapons: A Debate, 116 (emphasis added). 
27. Peter D. Feaver, Neooptimists and the Enduring Problem of Nuclear Proliferation, 
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RECENT EMPIRICAL EVALUATIONS 
Two standard criteria have been invoked: how the rival theory performs in 
critical cases, and which theory explains more overall. Bradley Thayer stresses 
overall explanatory power. In a review of books by Bruce Blair, Sagan, and 
Feaver about the risks that were associated with cold war nuclear operations, 
Thayer argues that these authors organizational theories cannot explain as 
much about nuclear doctrine and operations as can a systemic theory that em-
phasizes external threat.28 Thayer, in a later article, directly compares optimist 
and pessimist claims and concludes that Waltzs basic argumentis 
stronger.29 
Because pessimists have stressed the risks of nuclear escalation in new nu-
clear regions, optimists have argued that cases where mutual nuclear status is 
first being achieved constitute critical cases for pessimism. In one study, David 
Karl compares two regional rivalries in which crises developed after both par-
ties had achieved nuclear capabilities: the Soviet-Chinese and Indian-Pakistani 
relationships. Karl observes that the 1969 Sino-Soviet border conflict, when 
troops clashed several times along the Ussuri River, should have been a rela-
tively easy test for proliferation pessimism; and, putting it in terms of the op-
timist perspective, he notes that the [Indian] subcontinent is a least likely 
case for peaceful proliferation outcomes.30 Since crises between both sets of 
rivals were resolved without full-scale war, pessimism has failed under favor-
able circumstances while optimism has passed under unfavorable circum-
stances. 
Devin Hagerty similarly describes South Asia as a critical case for pessimism 
(which he calls the logic of nonproliferation). Hagerty examines two Indo-
Pakistani crises, in 198687 and 1990. He notes that these crises took place 
during the nuclear transition period in Pakistan, which is when pessimists see 
the greatest danger of preventive strikes. Hagerty suggests that a case refuting 
that consensuscasts doubt on the logic of nonproliferation.31 Overall, 
Hagerty concludes, the Indo-Pakistani nuclear experience more closely 
matches the expectations of the logic of nuclear deterrence than the logic of 
nonproliferation.32 Hagerty goes on to make perhaps the boldest statement of 
the optimist position, claiming There is no more ironclad law in international 
 
28. Bradley A. Thayer, The Risk of Nuclear Inadvertence: A Review Essay, Security Stud-
ies 3, no. 3 (spring 1994): 449, 467. 
29. Bradley A. Thayer, Nuclear Weapons as a Faustian Bargain, Security Studies 5, no. 1 
(autumn 1995): 150. 
30. David J. Karl, Proliferation Pessimism and Emerging Nuclear Powers, International 
Security 21, no. 3 (winter 1996/97): 1023. 
31. Hagerty, The Consequences of Nuclear Proliferation, 11516 (emphasis added). 
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relations theory than this: nuclear weapon states do not fight wars with one 
another.33  
EXCEPTIONS AND QUALIFICATIONS TO THE NUCLEAR PEACE THESIS 
This supposed law, if read literally, is not true. Hagerty seems to be defining 
war to mean only all-out military conflicts, as nuclear-armed states have fought 
each other at lower levels of violence. Sino-Soviet border clashes in 1969, after 
both countries had deployed nuclear arsenals, involved a series of fierce en-
gagements. Since Hagertys book was published, Indian and Pakistani troops 
fought in MayJuly 1999 around the town of Kargil in the disputed territory of 
Jammu and Kashmir. Accounts generally agree that the two sides suffered at 
least 1,000 fatalities, with some sources suggesting each side lost more than 
1,000 soldiers.34 If so, this would make the conflict a war according to the 
standard criteria used by political scientists, meaning the Kargil case falsified 
Hagertys ironclad law less than one year after his book was published. 
Any sweeping nuclear peace hypothesis also founders on the fact that 
non-nuclear weapon states have attacked nuclear weapon states. The Egyptian 
attack on Israel, triggering the 1973 Middle East War, and Argentinas invasion 
of the Falklands/Malvinas, leading to a war with Britain in 1982, should give 
some pause about the ability of nuclear deterrence to prevent all wars. Because 
Argentina was widely suspected of proliferation ambitions at that time, Britain 
could have feared that Argentina was potentially at the threshold of nuclear 
capability, but any uncertainty about this did not deter Britain from going to 
war, despite optimist claims that states will avoid such risks. 
The empirical record also does not support an inference that nuclear-armed 
regions will always enjoy greater peace and stability than if they had remained 
free of nuclear weapons. South Africa was involved in several military conflicts 
in its region during the years of its nuclear weapons program, but has lived in 
peace with its neighbors since dismantling its nuclear arsenal. Similarly, rela-
tions in the southern cone have been less contentious in the years since Argen-
tina and Brazil took steps to foreclose the nuclear weapons option.35 This does 
not necessarily imply a direct causal link: in both cases the forswearing of nu-
clear weapons and regional conflict resolution took place in a context of 
 
33. Ibid., 184. 
34. K. Alan Kronstadt, Nuclear Weapons and Ballistic Missile Proliferation in India and 
Pakistan: Issues for Congress, Congressional Research Service, Report RL30623, 31 July 
2000, 5; Sumantra Bose, Kashmir: Sources of Conflict, Dimensions of Peace, Survival 41, 
no. 3 (autumn 1999): 150. 
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broader changes. The main point, however, is that these examples caution 
against any facile conclusion that nuclear-armed regions will be more stable 
than non-nuclear regions. Optimists often imply that nuclear deterrence has a 
unique ability to induce stability in situations where anarchy otherwise guaran-
tees conflict. To the extent that there are empirical examples of regions achiev-
ing stable peace without nuclear proliferation, however, this premise is false. 
This means that, before accepting advice in favor of proliferation as a route to 
stability in a specific case, one must consider whether there is any feasible al-
ternative approach that could provide a similar level of stability while avoiding 
the risks and costs that are unique to nuclear weapons. 
Recent events in South Asia also suggest a logical flaw in any simplistic no-
tion that mutual nuclear deterrence prevents all war. Besides the 1999 Kargil 
conflict, India and Pakistan also mobilized for war after an armed assault on 
Indias parliament in December 2001, which Delhi blamed on Pakistani-
supported militants. Though no new fighting has occurred as of this writing (in 
August 2002), the situation remains unsettled. These flare-ups in South Asia 
since the Indian and Pakistani nuclear tests of 1998 indicate the continued rele-
vance of Glenn Snyders stability-instability paradox,36 in which the belief 
that nuclear deterrence prevents large-scale conventional conflict creates con-
fidence in the safety of engaging in lower intensity conflict. In fact, awareness 
of the paradox has emboldened both sides. Pakistani officials repeatedly ex-
pressed a belief that their newly demonstrated nuclear capability would prevent 
India from fully utilizing its conventional superiority, and this made them will-
ing to continue their support for insurgency in Kashmir until the reaction to 
the attack on Indias parliament convinced Islamabad to promise restraint.37 At 
the height of the crisis that followed this attack, Indian officials indicated that 
they too embraced the stability-instability paradox. Defense Minister George 
Fernandes and other Indian officials said they had no worries about using con-
ventional forces to stop militant operations based in Pakistan, because they 
were convinced Pakistan would be afraid to escalate in response to Indian use 
of force. As one high-level diplomat put it, there is a lot of strategic space 
between a low-intensity war waged with Pakistan and the nuclear threshold.38 
 
36. Glenn H. Snyder, Deterrence and Defense: Toward a Theory of National Security (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 1961). 
37. Samina Ahmed, Security Dilemmas of Nuclear-Armed Pakistan, Third World Quar-
terly 21, no. 5 (October 2000): 78889; Kronstadt, Nuclear Weapons and Ballistic Missile 
Proliferation, 5. 
38. For Fernandes comments, see Celia W. Dugger, India Defense Minister Belittles 
Pakistans Latest Gestures, New York Times, 3 January 2002, A3; unnamed diplomat quoted 
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Nor are these the only such cases. David Karl has found the stability-instability 
paradox also operated in earlier crises between new nuclear adversaries.39 
An earlier generation of writers thought the stability-instability paradox fol-
lowed logically from RDT, and events in South Asia seem to bear this out. Al-
though optimists expect nuclear deterrence to prevent any major escalation of 
such conflicts, they overstate the case if they suggest nuclear weapons prevent 
all forms of violence. In the wake of Kargil, Waltz now acknowledges this 
point. In the revised version of the Debate book, he has added several passages 
in which he notes that nuclear states may fight limited wars, but argues that the 
risk of nuclear war will still necessarily keep such wars limited.40 
This brings us back to the original issue in the debate, which is the chance 
that nuclear weapons would be used. Both post-1998 crises in South Asia had 
nuclear dimensions: officials made oblique and even overt threats to use nu-
clear weapons, and the two sides reportedly placed their nuclear forces on 
heightened alert.41 The implications of this for the optimism-pessimism debate 
are unclear, however. Did these actions help de-escalate the crises, thus sup-
porting optimist expectations, or are they a sign that nuclear war could have 
occurred, thus supporting pessimist fears? Sagan and Waltz address this ques-
tion in a new chapter written for the revised edition of their debate book, and 
not surprisingly they reach opposite conclusions. Below, I will suggest that in a 
sense they might both be right, because nuclear weapons produce contradic-
tory effects. 
This, however, should not obscure the fact that the optimist interpretation 
fits better with the positivist canons of mainstream social science. If one looks 
at the outcomes of interactions between nuclear-capable states, these out-
comes match the predictions of optimists to a greater extent than they fulfill 
the negative concerns of pessimists, even in cases that involve the conditions 
that pessimists see as most dangerous. In particular, there has never been a 
deterrence failure leading to nuclear war. Since the pessimists have themselves 
asserted the need for an alternative theory to RDT and claimed to have a better 
theory, the optimists can hardly be blamed for thinking that, because they 
 
39. Karl, Does Nuclear Proliferation Really Matter? 
40. Waltz, More May Be Better, in The Spread of Nuclear Weapons: A Debate Renewed, 37; 
and For Better: Nuclear Weapons Preserve an Imperfect Peace, the Waltz portion of a 
new chap. 3, Indian and Pakistani Nuclear Weapons: For Better or Worse? in The Spread of 
Nuclear Weapons: A Debate Renewed, 115, 122. 
41. Ahmed, Security Dilemmas of Nuclear-Armed Pakistan, 789; Center for Nonprolif-
eration Studies, Nuclear Abstracts Database, document 20614, no title, cites reports in two 
Indian publications suggesting nuclear forces were placed on alert during Kargil; Sagan, For 
the Worse: Till Death Do Us Part, Sagan portion of new chap. 3 in The Spread of Nuclear 
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come out ahead in the standard social science superiority tests, they have won 
the debate. 
Even if RDT is the more accurate theory, however, this does not alone make 
it valid to conclude that nuclear proliferation would in some cases be for the 
best. For policy purposes, there is a world of difference between a probabilistic 
theory and an iron law. If the probability of nuclear war is very low but not 
zerothat is, if the nuclear peace hypothesis is probabilistic, not ironclad
there may simply not have been enough interactions between nuclear-armed 
states to produce a deterrence failure. In this case, if enough nuclear weapon 
states interact over a long enough period of time, it becomes likely that nuclear 
weapons will again be used against populated areas, as they were twice previ-
ously in 1945. To claim that the tacit acceptance or selective promotion of 
proliferation is the clearly superior policy recommendation, it is necessary 
(though not sufficient) that the chances of nuclear war must be so close to 
zero that the benefits expected from the greater incentives to avoid major 
conventional wars could not plausibly be offset by a risk of nuclear use. Oth-
erwise, the issue becomes a trade-off in which one must decide what level of 
risk of nuclear destruction is tolerable in order to achieve the anticipated bene-
fits of a reduced probability of conventional war. 
REFRAMING THE STABILITY ISSUE: WHY RISK CANNOT BE ELIMINATED 
OR POLICY PURPOSES, therefore, it is not enough to evaluate which theory 
has the highest correlation with the empirical observations to date; evalu-
ating risk is also important. One risk that must be addressed is whether there is 
a realistic possibility that RDTs predictions of stability could be wrong. For two 
reasons, I will argue in this section, optimists have underestimated the likeli-
hood of nuclear war when proliferation occurs. First, the theories of optimists 
and pessimists are not necessarily mutually exclusive, but are instead poten-
tially complementary. Second, one can deduce logical reasons why a country 
acting rationally (as social scientists use that term) might nonetheless get into a 
nuclear war even when the other side has survivable nuclear forces. 
THEORY COMPLEMENTARITY 
Turning to the first point, the effort to resolve the debate on the basis of the-
ory testing leads studies to describe optimism and pessimism as contradictory 
rivals. The organizational and psychological arguments cited by pessimists 
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rational and systemic approaches favored by optimists. In fact, decisionmaking 
approaches are often invoked to explain deviations from rational behavior. 
From this perspective, one expects that most actors will, most of the time, 
behave in ways approximately consistent with an assumption of rationality. In 
some cases, however, certain actors will behave inconsistently with what a ra-
tional actor model would predict, sometimes with disastrous consequences. 
Decisionmaking pathologies provide a possible explanation in these deviant 
cases. Used in this manner, the inflexible organizational routines and variety of 
organizational and psychological biases invoked by decisionmaking theorists 
do not constitute a general theory. They therefore cannot be expected to ex-
plain a high percentage of observations. Rather, they complement a rational 
actor theory, explaining some of the cases where that theorys predictions are 
incorrect. 
In short, existing proliferation pessimism is really a theory of why RDT could 
be wrong. To induce caution about promoting proliferation, pessimists do not 
need a theory that suggests RDTs predictions will be wrong in most of the in-
teractions between nuclear-armed states; in practice, pessimists really empha-
size why deterrence could fail, even if it succeeds more often than not. Thus, 
Feaver does not argue that deterrence will necessarily fail, only that there is no 
basis for concluding it will always succeed: The evidence supports a probabil-
istic assessment that preventive strikes are unlikely, but does not admit of an 
assessment that rules them out entirely.42 Sagan expresses a stronger con-
viction that deterrence will eventually fail, claiming that the common biases, 
rigid routines, and parochial interests of [new proliferators] military organiza-
tions will lead to deterrence failures and uses of nuclear weapons despite na-
tional interests to the contrary.43 Still, this is not a claim that deterrence will 
fail in every crisis or between every pair of nuclear states, only that it will fail at 
some point. 
This debate about nuclear stability is simply not resolvable on the basis of 
empirical evidence at this point because it is about whether a low-probability 
event that has not been observed to date might nonetheless happen in the fu-
ture. The effort to develop an alternative to RDT has been valuable in calling 
attention to the unexpected things that could go wrong, but given the absence 
of cases that bear out the worst predictions of pessimists, the logic of their 
theory alone is unlikely to change the minds of those who are persuaded by 
optimists logic and evidence. What, however, if rational considerations them-
selves suggested a distinctly non-zero probability of nuclear war? Rather than 
 
42. Peter D. Feaver, Proliferation Pessimism and Emerging Nuclear Powers, in Corre-
spondence, International Security 22, no. 2 (fall 1997): 188. 









































SECURITY STUDIES 12, no. 1 (autumn 2002): 56 
limit the debate to a theory competition, it is also important to consider 
whether optimists have correctly deduced all of the implications of rational 
deterrence logic. If RDT itself predicted nuclear war under certain plausible 
scenarios, the optimist argument for accepting gradual proliferation would be 
greatly weakened. 
WHY RATIONAL BEHAVIOR DOES NOT PRECLUDE NUCLEAR USE 
In fact, there are several reasons why states that behave according to social 
science definitions of rationality could still create or find themselves in situa-
tions that lead to deterrence failure or the use of nuclear weapons. First, it is 
impossible to minimize simultaneously the risks involved in each of the three 
scenarios by which deterrence might fail. As Peter Feaver has pointed out re-
peatedly, there are unavoidable trade-offs in designing a command and control 
system.44 If one worries about the possibility of unauthorized use (the fail 
deadly scenario), one will choose a highly centralized command and control 
system. This increases the chances, however, that another state could achieve 
successful decapitation in a first strike (the fail impotent scenario), which 
might invite preemption. The alternative is to adopt a highly delegative system 
that reduces incentives for preemption by increasing the chances that one 
could retaliate in a second strike. Extensive predelegation of launch authority, 
however, also increases the risks that somebody will be able to fire off a nu-
clear weapon in the absence of an order to do so by central authorities. The 
risks of preemption and unauthorized launch may both be small, but they can-
not both simultaneously be reduced to zero. 
Similarly, incentives to avoid inviting preventive attack can ironically make 
other types of deterrence failure more likely. Potential adversaries will feel the 
most pressure to strike preemptively if they know a state is very close to the 
nuclear threshold but does not yet have a nuclear device. Hence, a state at this 
stage of development should rationally strive to maintain complete secrecy so 
no information about the extent of its progress comes to light. This leaves 
open a possibility, however, that an adversary will choose to go to war because 
it is ignorant of how close the state is to achieving nuclear capability. Under 
pressure of war, the state may accelerate completion of one or more nuclear 
devices. This, however, may not become known to the other side until it has 
already crossed the states red lines, thereby creating the very last resort 
situation in which the state feels it has to use its nuclear weapons. 
 
44. See Peter D. Feaver, Command and Control in Emerging Nuclear Nations, Interna-
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There are two examples that could have raised such a possibility had the 
wars in question gone differently. According to Avner Cohen, Israel apparently 
put together two improvised deliverable weapons just prior to the 1967 war, 
even though both Egypt and U.S. intelligence believed Israel had not yet 
crossed the nuclear threshold.45 If the Arabs had achieved greater success on 
the battlefield, they might have suffered nuclear retaliation from a deterrent 
they did not know existed. Similarly, prior to the 1991 Gulf War, the U.S. gov-
ernment apparently did not realize how close Iraq was to building its first nu-
clear weapon. While the United States and its coalition partners were getting 
their forces ready to go into action, Saddam ordered an all-out effort to com-
plete a device that he intended to use against Israel if coalition forces marched 
on Baghdad.46 Fortunately, Iraqi bomb-makers still needed at least a few 
months to complete the task, and the United States ultimately decided for 
other reasons not to make ousting Saddam one of its war aims. 
INCENTIVES ARISING FROM THE DUALISTIC NATURE OF NUCLEAR ARMS 
Two other reasons why nuclear war is possible under standard rationality as-
sumptions involve the intrinsic nature of nuclear weapons themselves. Because 
nuclear weapons are so destructive, proliferation optimists expect states to 
behave extremely carefully. Fear of nuclear devastation, however, can cut two 
ways. It can make national leaders shrink away from the brink, as optimists 
expect. In addition, though, the danger of nuclear attack can also be provoca-
tive, triggering action intended to forestall the danger. In short, both flight 
and fight responses are possible. Their awesome destructive power means 
nuclear weapons are dualistic in their effects: they are likely both to dampen 
and to inflame tensions in regions where they are introduced. 
Nuclear weapons can exacerbate tensions in two ways: by creating an in-
creased perception of threat and by prompting efforts to limit damage in the 
event of nuclear war. On the first point, proliferation optimists write as if po-
tential adversaries exist at a given, fixed level of hostility. This is unlikely to be 
the case. Rather, a state that acquires nuclear weapons is likely to be perceived 
as more threatening than it was before. This will be partly because of the new, 
more destructive capabilities at its disposal. In some cases, however, a 
states pursuit of nuclear weapons may also change how other states view its 
intentions. 
 
45. Avner Cohen, Israel and the Bomb (New York: Columbia University Press, 1998), 273
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This is especially likely because new and aspiring nuclear states are not al-
ways circumspect in their pronouncements. In March 1994, in the midst of a 
crisis over North Koreas suspected nuclear weapons program, the Norths 
chief negotiator threatened his South Korean counterpart that a war could 
break out in which the South would be turned into a sea of fire.47 After the 
May 1998 nuclear tests in India, Prime Minister Vajpayee wrote President Clin-
ton and explicitly cited a threat from China as a motivation for the tests. 
Statements by Defense Minister Fernandes shortly before and again shortly 
after the tests also described China as potential threat number one to India.48 
Other Indian officials publicly warned Pakistan to end its support for separatist 
insurgents in Kashmir. Home Minister Advani called on Islamabad to realize 
the change in the geostrategic situation and said that in the new circum-
stances even the option of hot pursuit would not be ruled out.49 Such state-
ments are bound to be provocative to the states against which they are di-
rected. States on the receiving end of new, public nuclear threats will likely feel 
a need to display their toughness as a way to show they will not be intimidated. 
While nuclear weapons do encourage caution, they can also create pressures to 
demonstrate resolve, and any such demonstration carries with it some risk of 
escalation. 
There is a second reason why, even if all behavior is rational, nuclear 
weapons do not act exclusively to reduce the chances of war: policymakers 
must consider whether deterrence could fail. No responsible political or mili-
tary leader will want to rest his or her nations survival on the assumption de-
terrence will always work; such leaders will have to ask what if deterrence 
fails? Once strategic planners consider this question one major goal is likely to 
be to limit the damage that would result. The nuclear postures adopted by the 
United States and the Soviet Union during their rivalry show where this goal 
can lead: a state concerned about the possibility of deterrence failing may seek 
counterforce capabilities that could be used to destroy as much of the oppo-
nents nuclear arsenal as possible before it can be used against the state. 
Because a completely successful first strike is so hard to achieve, a rational 
leader will not launch one unless the chances of avoiding war start to look very 
 
47. Mitchell Reiss, Bridled Ambition: Why Countries Constrain Their Nuclear Capabilities (Wash-
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remote. There are circumstances, however, under which one could come to 
think that war is imminent or even inevitable. An opposing leader could be 
acting and talking in a way that suggests she or he does not understand or does 
not fear the consequences of nuclear war, or that she or he would rather see 
the enemys country destroyed even at the risk of his or her countrys survival. 
For example, prior to and during the 1991 Gulf War, Saddam Husseins rheto-
ric made Israeli leaders express doubt that the Iraqi leader would be deterred 
from attacking Israel with chemical weapons by the threat that Israel could 
retaliate with nuclear weapons.50 Alternatively, one might get false warning of 
nuclear attack that one believes is credible. Or one might have lost control of 
military units that are pressing an attack into the other sides homeland and be 
unable to convince the other side that these are renegade units, so that the 
other side issues explicit nuclear warnings. 
In such circumstances, a leader can refrain from launching the countrys 
weapons in the hope that the warning signs are wrong and war can still be 
avoided. If the leader is wrong, however, his or her country will suffer the full 
devastation of the other sides nuclear strike. In these circumstances, even if 
one cannot knock out all of the other sides weapons, the possibility of de-
stroying some of them before launch might still look like the best option. Los-
ing two or three cities is a terrible disaster, but it is not as bad as losing five or 
eight or ten cities. In sum, if deterrence failure appears sufficiently likely and 
imminent, ordering a counterforce first strike can make rational sense even if 
one does not anticipate completely successful preemption, merely as a way to 
try to limit the damage.51 This may be especially so in new nuclear weapon 
states. Proliferation optimists assume most new proliferators will have only 
small nuclear arsenals. Against a country with say 10 to 20 nuclear weapons, a 
first strike that could knock out half or two-thirds might look attractive if the 
circumstances appear sufficiently dire. 
The possible interest in damage limitation has implications for two specific 
arguments that arise in the optimism-pessimism debate. First, a number of 
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pessimists have charged that Waltz is inconsistent.52 He assumes rational be-
havior, suggests that small arsenals are better for stability (they allow achieve-
ment of second-strike capabilities, but dont involve expensive efforts to de-
velop potentially destabilizing counterforce weapons), and then dismisses the 
massive nuclear buildups and war-fighting doctrines of the United States and 
Soviet Union as reflecting decades of fuzzy thinking.53 Pessimists generally 
argue that the U.S. and Soviet excesses mean that Waltz should also admit the 
possibility of lapses of rationality that could lead to deterrence failures. 
It is possible, however, to resolve the argument by deciding there is no in-
consistency. Although I personally believe that the superpowers cold war nu-
clear postures did not make sense, one could make a case that their massive 
buildups and development of counterforce weapons and doctrines were a ra-
tional response to the situation as U.S. and Soviet leaders perceived it. Each 
believed there were circumstances under which the other might not be de-
terred and might launch a nuclear attack. Just in case conditions ever reached 
the point where one thought such a nightmare event was about to take place, it 
would be desirable to have the capability to target the other sides forces and 
to launch first, in the hope, however unlikely, that this would reduce the scale 
of the others attack sufficiently that some of ones country might survive. The 
fact that U.S. and Soviet leaders and military planners spent so much time 
thinking about the unthinkableand actively preparing for itsuggests that 
other nuclear weapon states might view it as rational to do so as well. 
The key question is not whether such behavior really was or is rational. The 
question is whether such behavior is consistent with RDT and should therefore 
be expected even under optimist assumptions. If optimists want to defend the 
predictive power of RDT, they must consider the possibility that cold war su-
perpower behavior was consistent with its predictions. The assumption that 
states want to survive should lead us to expect that new nuclear states will de-
sire counterforce capabilities that might let them limit the damage if they be-
lieve an opponents nuclear attack is imminent. If states put any weight on the 
possibility that deterrence might fail, they may pursue weapon systems and use 
doctrines that actually create crisis instability and an attendant risk of inadver-
tent deterrence failure. 
The second implication of pressures to seek damage limitation is therefore 
that optimists are too quick to dismiss the possibility of preemption. Optimists 
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argue that states will never attempt a first strike because they can never be cer-
tain of achieving 100 percent success, and the possibility of retaliation with 
even a few nuclear weapons makes preemption too great a risk.54 As long as 
state leaders value the survival of their society,55 this is certainly true for any 
premeditated bolt from the blue. If one believes, however, that an attack by 
the other side is about to take place, then one might not require a guarantee of 
a perfect first strike, but merely a reasonable chance that one can destroy 
enough of the other sides forces to make a meaningful difference in the dam-
age one suffers. 
Waltz simply does not get this point. In the revised version of the debate 
book, he writes: The initial advantage [of striking first] is insignificant if the 
cost of gaining it is half a dozen cities.56 If leaders believe, however, that the 
choice has boiled down to losing six cities or losing twelve, they may see a first 
strike as a way to save six cities. If prospect theorywhich suggests that people 
are especially willing to gamble to try to reduce what appear to be certain 
lossesis correct, the chances of such a choice are even greater than RDT 
would anticipate.57 
This reveals the problem with phrasing the second requirement for deter-
rence stability as the existence of second-strike capabilities. Secure second-
strike forces add greatly to crisis stability, but they are not sufficient to ensure 
that there are no deliberate decisions to launch first. In circumstances where 
there are growing doubts about whether nuclear deterrence will continue to 
hold, damage-limitation pressures could potentially lead to an intentional deci-
sion to preempt even with an expectation that the opponent will have some 
forces that could survive and strike second. 
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In sum, nuclear weapons create pressures and incentives in more than one 
direction; their effects are dualistic. By inducing fear of nuclear war, the devel-
opment of nuclear forces creates reasons to behave cautiously, which enhances 
stability. The same fear also creates concern in other states about the prolifera-
tors intentions, pressures to seek damage-limitation capabilities, incentives to 
keep secret ones progress toward a nuclear deterrent, and trade-offs between 
efforts to prevent unwanted use and efforts to ensure retaliation in the event 
of attack. These incentives and trade-offs mean there are seemingly rational 
behaviors that could increase the chances of conflict and lead to either inten-
tional or inadvertent nuclear use. Even with the existence of second-strike ca-
pabilities and fully rational behavior, there are logical reasons why the chance 
of nuclear war cannot be reduced to zero. When one adds to this the recogni-
tion that rational and decisionmaking approaches are in some ways comple-
mentary, so that nonrational factors could also lead to a small number of ex-
ceptional cases where deterrence fails, it should be regarded as far from proven 
that stable nuclear deterrence is easy to achieve and makes nuclear war impos-
sible. 
Of course, because there have been no cases of nuclear war, its possibility 
has also not been proven. Although the argument that the risk is real may dis-
suade some states from pursuing proliferation, it will not dissuade all. Some 
may be attracted to the expected benefits such as a reduced chance of conven-
tional war, and may convince themselves that the chances of nuclear war really 
are quite small. If one granted this much of the optimist case, would it mean 
that selective nuclear proliferation is actually desirable? 
THE NEED TO BROADEN THE FOCUS BEYOND STABILITY 
UPPORTERS OF the gradual and selective spread of nuclear arms base their 
case on a utilitarian calculation. Mutual nuclear deterrence, they argue, 
greatly reduces (or even eliminates) the chances of large-scale conventional 
war. Balanced against this, most optimists accept that there is some irreducible 
risk of accidents or unauthorized use, but they claim these nuclear dangers 
have only a low probability of occurring and will not lead to further escala-
tion.58 Since the Kargil conflict, they also acknowledge that the stability-
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instability paradox may lead to greater low-level conflict, but again assert that 
fear of nuclear war guarantees such conflicts will not escalate. Hence, the op-
timist case rests on an expectation that the number of lives saved and physical 
destruction averted through the prevention of major war will outweigh the 
lives lost and destruction from possible accidental or unauthorized nuclear 
detonations and low-intensity conflict. As Waltz puts it, The possibility of 
fighting at low levels is not a bad price to pay for the impossibility of fighting 
at high levels.59 
Both this positive case for proliferation and the counterarguments, however, 
rest on estimates that involve considerable uncertainty. What is the actual 
probability that there will be major conventional wars in the absence of mutual 
nuclear deterrence, and how many casualties would such wars produce? Could 
an alternative approach to conflict resolution prevent war in the absence of 
nuclear proliferation, as in the example of Argentine-Brazilian relations? What 
is the likelihood of accidental nuclear launches or detonations and the number 
of casualties these would cause, as well as the loss of life to be expected from 
increased low-intensity conflict? No one on either side of the debate has at-
tempted to provide firm estimates in response to any of these questions, and 
any effort to do so would require a lot of guesswork. Finally, is a utilitarian 
calculation even the right yardstick? Because those killed if nuclear weapons 
are used are most likely to be civilians, one might decide that ethical impera-
tives to avoid loss of civilian life require accepting a somewhat greater risk of 
soldiers being killed. 
Given the uncertainties and value judgments involved, it may be impossible 
to reach any consensus conclusion about whether proliferation is good or bad 
for the goals of peace and stability. There are both potential benefits and po-
tential dangers, but reasonable people may disagree about which is greater. If 
the arguments on one or the other side of this question do not strike a policy-
maker as decisive, then their decisions about proliferation might be affected by 
the consideration of other possible impacts of nuclear weapons programs. 
Efforts to develop and deploy nuclear weapons have many consequences 
besides their effect on stability, some of which can seriously affect the well-
being of a countrys people and institutions. For more than a decade, the field 
of security studies has been embroiled in a debate about whether such factors 
should be included in the definition of security.60 The optimism-pessimism 
debate, however, has paid almost no attention to this larger debate in the 
security field. 
 
59. Waltz, For Better, in A Debate Renewed, 122. 
60. For a key early statement, see Jessica Tuchman Matthews, Redefining Security, For-
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In fact, the debate has focused almost exclusively on the stability of nuclear 
relationships and closely related concerns. Peter Feaver has even defined the 
debate in terms that suggest it is only about stability: The optimist-pessimist 
debate concerns whether the spread of nuclear weapons leads to greater geo-
political stability because nuclear weapons are conducive to mutual deterrence 
(optimism) or whether the spread of nuclear weapons leads to greater instabil-
ity because the new nuclear arsenals might be more prone to accidental, unau-
thorized, or even intentional use than were the superpower arsenals (pessi-
mism).61 In the most comprehensive review of the debate to date, Peter La-
voy lists twelve specific concerns about nuclear proliferation that have been 
subjects of the debate.62 All twelve involve highly traditional security concerns: 
the first eleven comprise different scenarios in which nuclear weapons might 
go off or nuclear states might initiate or experience military conflict, and the 
twelfth concern is a possible loss of major power influence over other states.63 
Lavoy also brings up possible economic costs, as does Steve Miller, but beyond 
these brief exceptions the participants in the debate have limited their discus-
sion solely to the effects of proliferation on traditional international security 
concerns.64 
There have been a couple of suggestions to broaden the debate. These have 
raised important considerations, but their concerns still fit within a narrow 
definition of security. Brad Roberts has made a compelling case for the need to 
consider other types of proliferation besides nuclear and to investigate how all 
these forms of proliferation affect the prospects for world order after the cold 
war.65 Also, Nathan Busch has made an insightful argument that the pessimist 
 
61. Peter D. Feaver, The Theory-Policy Debate in Political Science and Nuclear Prolif-
eration, National Security Studies Quarterly 5, no. 3 (summer 1999): 74. For reasons described 
above, I disagree with this framing of the question even if one does limit the focus to stabil-
ity. It is not necessary to prove that proliferation leads to greater instability to argue that 
nuclear acquisition would be an inadvisable policy for a currently non-nuclear power. It is 
more relevant to consider whether the risks of nuclear war, while possibly low, are not low 
enough to make it worth taking the risk. 
62. Lavoy, The Strategic Consequences, 718, table 4. 
63. On this specific concern viz. the United States, see also Feaver, Optimists, Pessi-
mists, and Theories, 771; and Steven R. David, Risky Business: Let Us Not Take a Chance 
on Proliferation, Security Studies 4, no. 4 (summer 1995): 77576. 
64. Lavoy, The Strategic Consequences, 73537; Steven E. Miller, The Case against a 
Ukrainian Nuclear Deterrent, Foreign Affairs 72, no. 3 (summer 1993): 77. In a more recent 
article on India and Pakistan specifically, Lavoy examines economic costs in greater detail 
and also begins to get into some other areas, such as domestic political consequences of 
proliferation (Peter R. Lavoy, The Costs of Nuclear Weapons in South Asia, in Nuclear 
India in the Twenty-First Century, ed. D. R. SarDesai and Raju G. C. Thomas [New York: Pal-
grave, 2002], 25976). 
65. Brad Roberts, Rethinking the Proliferation Debate, Security Studies 4, no. 4 (summer 
1995): 79296; Brad Roberts, Weapons Proliferation and World Order: After the Cold War (The 
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literature, with its emphasis on command and control issues, initially over-
looked problems that might arise because new proliferants could lack the abil-
ity to maintain physical security of their nuclear materials.66 Weaknesses in this 
area, known as materials protection, control and accounting (MPC&A), could 
permit the theft or diversion of bomb-making materials. These materials could 
fall into the hands of terrorists, who might use them to make a radiological 
weapon or an actual nuclear explosive device (in the revised version of the 
debate book, Sagan has also added the risk of nuclear terrorism as another 
argument against proliferation67). These suggested areas for a broadened focus 
all make sense, but they basically involve developing a more complete picture 
of the effects of proliferation on international stability. None of them get at 
other types of costs and benefits that nuclear weapons acquisition might have 
for new nuclear states themselves. 
If, however, policymakers are uncertain about how to weigh the hoped-for 
benefits in terms of regional stability against the potential risks of nuclear 
weapons use, other considerations may tip the balance. Below, I describe the 
possible costs and benefits of nuclear weapons in four other areas: economic, 
environmental and health, psychological, and with respect to domestic political 
institutions. The emphasis is on intrinsic implications of nuclear weapons pro-
grams, and not on any additional costs or benefits that might result from inter-
national reactions. Thus, the section on economic effects does not consider 
the costs that might arise if economic sanctions are imposed on a state for 
going nuclear. The goal is to establish a firm baseline of the costs and benefits 
that any new nuclear state should expect, even in a scenario where there are no 
adverse international responses. 
ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES 
Conventional wisdom holds this to be an area where nuclear weapons are a net 
benefit. Because nuclear arms are thought to provide more bang for the 
buck, there has been a belief that going nuclear enables countries to save 
money on defense. Waltz thus argues that new nuclear states are likely to 
decrease rather than to increase their military spending, and describes 
nuclear acquisition as a low cost way of leveling the playing field with a 
                                                                        
eration studies to pay more attention to chemical and biological weapons (Universal Deter-
rence or Conceptual Collapse?). 
66. Nathan Busch, What the Proliferation Debate Has Ignored: Command and Control, 
MPC&A, and the Case of China (paper presented at the 41st annual International Studies 
Association convention, 1418 March 2000, Los Angeles, Calif.). 
67. See Sagan, For the Worse, 100; and Sagan Responds to Waltz, 15765, in The 
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conventionally superior rival.68 This belief is almost certainly a myth, however. 
There are two reasons to expect that nuclear programs will add a great deal to 
military spending. First, developing a secure and usable nuclear arsenal actually 
requires an enormous investment. Second, because of the limited usefulness of 
nuclear weapons for purposes other than deterring existential threats, nuclear-
armed states are unlikely to cut back their conventional forces. 
On the first point, building a nuclear arsenal involves many separate invest-
ments. A state has to mine or purchase uranium, build special facilities to con-
vert this uranium into fissile materials, and then construct the actual bombs or 
warheads. Most new proliferators will be seeking to keep this activity secret, so 
there will be further expenses to build the bomb-making infrastructure in a 
way that might let it stay hidden. In addition, most countries have felt a need 
to test their weapons designs before introducing them into their military 
forces, so there may also be expenses to construct test sites and conduct test 
explosions. States must also pay for the scientists and engineers whose talents 
are needed to make all this happen. 
Once bombs are built, states also need delivery systems. Four of the original 
five nuclear weapon states built a triad of delivery vehicles: aircraft, land-
based ballistic missiles, and sea-based ballistic missiles placed aboard subma-
rines. Britain, the only nuclear power not to deploy a triad, still used both air-
craft and submarine-launched missiles. These advanced weapons systems are 
all quite expensive to purchase or develop. There are further expenses to de-
ploy the weapons systems and safeguard them against possible attack, such as 
by building hardened silos. 
To be able to use the weapons if necessary adds more costs. To know where 
to target the weapons, states need to collect intelligence on their adversaries to 
identify the locations of desired targets. Furthermore, states have to develop 
highly survivable command and control systems to ensure the continued ability 
to communicate with nuclear forces in the event of war. Most states have also 
desired to have early warning networks to provide reliable, advance notice of 
nuclear attack (or reassurance that a nuclear attack is not underway). Moreover, 
extensive troop training is required to develop a reliable cadre of launch offi-
cers and prepare the military for possible nuclear contingencies. 
Because a nuclear deterrent force involves much more than just building the 
bomb itself, the cumulative costs can be enormous. A research project at the 
Brookings Institution headed by Stephen Schwartz estimated the total nuclear-
weapons-related expenses incurred by the United States from 1940 to 1996, in 
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1996 dollars, to be a staggering $5.5 trillion. This means the costs of develop-
ing and maintaining the nuclear arsenal averaged $98 billion per year in this 
period.69 
Even second-tier nuclear weapon states have spent considerable sums. Brit-
ain and France, although they benefited from defense cooperation with the 
United States, had to spend some $3 billion to $5 billion per year to build their 
nuclear deterrents. Reflecting this, as of 1993, an independent estimate placed 
the cumulative cost of the French nuclear program at $170 billion.70 
The startup costs for the most recent nuclear aspirants have also been sig-
nificant. Independent experts generally estimate that Iraq spent $10 billion on 
its bomb program before the 1991 Gulf Warbut Khidhir Hamza, who was 
the top Iraqi bomb designer before he defected, says Iraq spent $10 billion in 
just three years in the late 1980s, meaning that its total costs may have been 
much greater.71 Peter Lavoy calculates that India and Pakistan each had to in-
vest more than $5 billion to produce fissile materials and a small number of 
weapons; this estimate does not include the additional costs for delivery vehi-
cles, command and control, and other weapons-related expenses. Recent esti-
mates of the likely cumulative costs by Indian analysts vary considerably. One 
has suggested a truly minimum deterrent could be deployed for $800 million. If 
India seeks a robust triad, the countrys experts estimate the expense as any-
where from $13 billion to as much as $170 billion over the next 30 years.72 
For poor countries like India and Pakistan, these investments entail signifi-
cant opportunity costs. Lavoy estimates that even a minimal deterrent is 
equivalent to one quarter of the cost sending every Indian child to school, 
while journalist Rammanohar Reddy claims that what India spends on its 
nuclear deterrent could cover the increment necessary to provide universal 
elementary education in that country. According to Lavoy, the price tag for 
 
69. Stephen I. Schwartz, ed., Atomic Audit: The Costs and Consequences of U.S. Nuclear Weap-
ons since 1940 (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1998), 3. The $5.5 trillion figure does 
not include anticipated future expenses to clean up environmental contamination from the 
nuclear weapons program. These expenses are discussed in the next section of this article. 
70. Miller, The Case against a Ukrainian Nuclear Deterrent, 77; Albert Donnay and 
Martin Kuster, France, in Nuclear Wastelands: A Global Guide to Nuclear Weapons Productions 
and Its Health and Environmental Effects, ed. Arjun Makhijani, Howard Hu, and Katherine Yih 
(Cambridge: MIT Press, 1995), 443. 
71. Joseph DiChiaro III and Edward J. Laurance, Nuclear Weapons in a Changing 
World: Consequences for Development, The Nonproliferation Review 1, no. 2 (winter 1994): 
39; Seng, Less is More, 6465; Hamza, Saddams Bombmaker, 334. 
72. Peter R. Lavoy, The Costs of Nuclear Weapons in South Asia, 264, 266 (the latter 
page cites the $800 million and $13 billion Indian estimates); T. V. Rajeswar, Costly Deter-
rence, Hindustan Times, September 6, 1999, http://www2.hindustantimes.com/nonfram/ 
060999/detOPI1.htm. The figure of $170 billion comes from an estimate of Rs 70,000 crore 
to Rs 770,000 crore cited in this last article, and is based on a conversion rate of 1 rupee 









































SECURITY STUDIES 12, no. 1 (autumn 2002): 68 
Pakistans missiles and nuclear weapons would be enough to both feed and 
educate nearly all its children.73 
Waltz asserts the South Asian states will build only a minimal deterrent and 
will not overspend like the United States, because Indian and Pakistani lead-
ers have learned from our folly.74 Unfortunately, the evidence suggests other-
wise. In practice, each of the second-generation nuclear weapon states appears 
interested in following the first-generation states by deploying its weapons on a 
triad. Israel, India and Pakistan all possess both aircraft and land-based missiles 
capable of delivering nuclear weapons, and each appears interested in a sea-
based leg. A June 2000 report in Londons Sunday Times even suggested that 
Israel has already achieved a strategic triad. The report said that Israel had test 
launched a nuclear-capable missile that could be fired from its three Dolphin-
class submarines.75 India is working to develop a nuclear submarine and an 
accompanying sea-launched missile, to be called the Sagarika, and a draft nu-
clear doctrine devised by a government advisory board has recommended pro-
ceeding to deploy weapons in a triad.76 Even Pakistan has officially assigned a 
nuclear role to its Navy. Some naval officers hope to develop the ability to 
launch nuclear-tipped missiles from surface ships, and a naval spokesperson 
reportedly stated in early 2001 that Pakistan is considering trying to place nu-
clear missiles on three Agosta-class submarines it purchased from France.77 In 
sum, even countries that say they seek only a minimum deterrent are likely to 
spend at least several billion dollars and probably more developing their nu-
clear arsenal. 
These costs might be acceptable, however, if they were offset by even 
greater savings from reduced spending on conventional forces. In practice, this 
is unlikely to be the case. As noted above, nuclear-armed states face a contin-
ued and possibly increased chance of being engaged in low-intensity conflicts. 
In addition, most nuclear states have sought historically to maintain robust 
 
73. Lavoy, The Costs of Nuclear Weapons, 267; War in South Asia: Politics, Econom-
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the Woodrow Wilson Center, 15 May 2002, http://www.wwics.si.edu/news/digest/war-
soasia.html. 
74. Waltz, For Better, in The Spread of Nuclear Weapons: A Debate Renewed, 109. This is 
another example of Waltz citing a lack of prudence by the first nuclear powers without see-
ing it as possible evidence that new nuclear powers might also fail to exercise the prudence 
his theory predits. 
75. Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Proliferation Brief 3, no. 18, 29 June 2000. 
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Doctrine: Confused Ambitions, Nonproliferation Review 7, no. 3 (fallwinter 2000): 12335. 
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conventional forces as a firebreak between any conventional conflict and esca-
lation to the nuclear level. The evidence suggests that nuclear weapon states 
actually end up spending more on defense than they would otherwise. For ex-
ample, British and French military expenditures, measured either as a percent-
age of GNP or per capita, have been higher than those of Germany or the 
NATO Europe average.78 Jordan Seng, writing prior to the 1998 nuclear tests in 
South Asia, found that overall defense spending by India, Israel, and Pakistan 
all increased significantly after they developed nuclear weapons capability. 
India and Pakistan both boosted their defense budgets even further after the 
May 1998 tests. Indias defense spending rose by 11 percent in the year follow-
ing the tests; then, in 2000, the defense budget went up again, by an astound-
ing 28 percent. India allotted a further 14 percent increase for 2001, before 
spending started to level off in 2002 when the government requested only a 4.8 
percent increase.79 Abundant evidence thus suggests that there will not be net 
economic savings from going down the nuclear path.80 
ENVIRONMENTAL AND HEALTH CONSEQUENCES 
The health and environmental impacts of nuclear weapons programs are sub-
stantial and almost wholly negative. This section takes a conservative approach 
and describes only the risks most likely to accompany nuclear weapons pro-
duction by new states. Thus, certain past activities that produced significant 
harm to human health are not included at all in the following discussion of 
expected consequences of proliferation; the most important examples are 
atmospheric nuclear testing and uranium mining.81 Fortunately, further 
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81. Based on current U.S. standards for estimating cancer risk from radiation, it has been 
estimated that fallout from worldwide atmospheric testing will cause about a quarter million 
fatal cancers by the end of the 21st century and more than a million fatal cancers by the time 









































SECURITY STUDIES 12, no. 1 (autumn 2002): 70 
atmospheric testing is unlikely. One also cannot assume that new atomic 
weapon programs will lead to new uranium mining: future proliferants either 
may not have uranium deposits on their territory, or those that do may have 
already started mining their uranium for civil purposes and not need additional 
mining to obtain bomb-making materials. For certain other activities, only 
some of their past consequences are described below, while some of their 
other past features are omitted. For example, some aspects of the earliest years 
of U.S. and Soviet plutonium-production operations are truly appalling in retro-
spect,82 but for that same reason there is no reason to assume new nuclear 
states will imitate these practices. Hence, I do not cite them here, in keeping 
with the goal of focusing only on the risks that future proliferants will find it 
difficult to avoid. 
Even setting aside these potential concerns, considerable health and envi-
ronmental threats will arise from any new attempts to make nuclear weapons. 
This involves one further assumption: that states will not go nuclear by steal-
ing existing nuclear weapons or buying them on the black market. Despite 
loose nuke worries after the breakup of the Soviet Union, there is no known 
case of a state obtaining a nuclear device from the territory of another state.83 
Moreover, optimist logic requires states to do more than obtain one or two 
bombs. Optimists assume states will deploy a survivable second-strike arsenal, 
and this will require tens or perhaps hundreds of devices. The unlikelihood of 
acquiring so many warheads illicitly, as well as desire not to be dependent on 
an outside supplier for ones deterrent, will impel aspiring proliferants to de-
velop their own infrastructure for producing nuclear weapons. 
Once a state decides to seek the ability to make its own bomb, it will face 
some health risks that arise from nuclear-weapons work even when nothing 
goes wrong and others that arise from potential accidents. The main groups at 
risk are workers at nuclear weapons facilities and residents of nearby commu-
nities. One might hope that states will learn from the experiences of earlier 
nuclear states how to reduce the risks, thereby making the examples of past 
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problems cited below less relevant. Three factors, however, limit the extent of 
learning possible. First, some risks are inherent in nuclear programs and cannot 
be avoided. Second, current nuclear weapon states have been loath to ac-
knowledge the environmental and health consequences of their programs. As a 
result, they have attempted neither to draw nor to disseminate any lessons 
from their experiences, which makes it harder for others to learn from those 
experiences. Third, future proliferants are unlikely to give priority to learning 
how to avoid environmental problems or to putting any lessons learned into 
practice. 
There are three reasons why future proliferants are unlikely to minimize 
health and environmental risks: these are the secrecy, urgency, and larger 
mindset associated with nuclear weapons programs. Because nuclear arms pro-
jects are typically shrouded in secrecy, it is difficult to subject them to the same 
levels of oversight and accountability as open government and commercial 
activities. This makes it easier for dangerous practices and environmental haz-
ards to continue unchecked. In addition, nuclear weapons are often seen as 
necessary to meet an urgent national security threat, meaning top priority will 
be given to producing weapons quickly. This can lead facilities to cut corners 
at the expense of safety considerations and to postpone efforts to deal with 
any long-term problems that may be developing. 
Finally, as Arjun Makhijani observes, nuclear weapons programs inherently 
entail a readiness to harm people.84 Nuclear deterrence requires states to 
make credible a threat to kill perhaps millions of people if necessary. Once one 
has crossed the mental threshold to thinking in terms of so many potential 
civilian casualties, dangers that threaten the lives of only dozens or hundreds 
or even thousands of people may simply not register as significant. 
In the following subsections, I first describe the unavoidable hazards in nu-
clear weapons work, then summarize the most significant types of accidents 
that nuclear weapon states might suffer. Next, I summarize what is known 
about the effects on worker health, followed by a discussion of the main risks 
that surrounding communities may confront. I conclude this review of envi-
ronmental and health effects by evaluating the likelihood that new nuclear 
states can avoid these dangers. 
HAZARDOUS MATERIALS CREATE INHERENT RISKS 
The key to an independent nuclear capability is production of fissile materials: 
either plutonium or highly enriched uranium (HEU), or both. These materials, 
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which are necessary to generate a nuclear explosion, can only be obtained 
through elaborate industrial processes. Plutonium, which does not exist in na-
ture, must be created in a nuclear reactor and then chemically separated (a pro-
cess known as reprocessing) from other materials in the spent nuclear fuel. 
Naturally occurring uranium consists almost entirely of the nonfissile isotope 
U-238, so the initially slight percentage of fissile U-235 must be greatly in-
creased through one of several known enrichment technologies. Of the two 
possible bomb-making materials, plutonium involves some especially serious 
risks that have historically caused the most harm of any aspect of nuclear 
weapons manufacturing. Creating HEU, however, also involves health and envi-
ronmental risks. 
Besides fissile materials production, a nuclear weapons program also in-
volves research labs to design the weapons, facilities to produce other materials 
and components necessary to build bombs, and plants for the final assembly 
and disassembly of the weapons. These other facilities also typically create ra-
dioactive and toxic wastes and other hazards. Beyond the manufacturing proc-
ess, problems can also arise when materials or finished weapons are in trans-
port or storage or after weapons have been deployed. 
Inherent risks arise because it is impossible to completely prevent human 
exposure to the hazardous materials involved in building nuclear weapons. 
Obviously, nuclear weapons greatest difference from conventional arms is the 
role of substances that emit radiation: these include not only uranium and plu-
tonium, but also decay products of these elements, other fission products cre-
ated in plutonium production reactors, and tritium (hydrogen-3), which is of-
ten used as a neutron source to trigger or boost a nuclear explosive device. 
Plutonium is particularly carcinogenic if it gets into the body. The safe dose is 
about one seven-thousandth of a gram, so breathing in even a tiny particle of 
plutonium dust can cause cancer.85 
Uranium poses more risk from its chemical than its radioactive properties 
(though it can also be a carcinogen). It is a toxic heavy metal that can cause 
kidney damage. In some processes a bomb-making program might employ, 
uranium is converted into the gaseous compound uranium hexafluoride. This 
gas is both toxic and highly corrosive, and when it touches water it breaks 
down, producing hydrofluoric acid, which can cause respiratory damage and 
severe burns.86 
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Nuclear weapons manufacture both requires and generates nonradioactive 
hazardous substances as well. One example is the metal beryllium, which is 
used as a tamper to reflect neutrons back into a plutonium warhead pit. Work-
ing with beryllium creates a high risk of various lung diseases, including an in-
curable condition similar to black lung disease. Obtaining lithium-6, which is 
used as a target in the creation of tritium and as a component in hydrogen 
bombs, requires large quantities of mercury to separate the lithium-6 from 
other lithium isotopes. Exposure to even small amounts of mercury can lead to 
neurological damage. Making nuclear weapons also requires using organic sol-
vents that can damage the brain, nervous system, liver, kidneys and skin; some 
of these solvents are also carcinogenic.87 
DANGERS FROM ACCIDENTS 
The radioactive and toxic substances associated with nuclear weapons pro-
grams create some health risks whenever they must be handled or disposed of 
as waste. Beyond this, they also make possible certain kinds of accidents, and 
even when they are not a direct cause of accidents they can make them more 
deadly. Even though these accidents can cause significant harm, no existing 
nuclear weapon state has completely succeeded in avoiding them. 
Plutonium reprocessing leads to probably the most difficult problems, be-
cause it creates vast quantities of highly radioactive liquid waste. This high-
level waste (HLW) can be a source of health threats even when there are no 
accidents, but it also creates a risk of catastrophic accident. In order to contain 
material with such a high radiation level, plutonium reprocessing complexes 
usually store their HLW in steel tanks, but this also produces a risk of a massive 
explosion. The wastes generate hydrogen gas and, depending on the chemicals 
stored in the tank, may produce other gases as well. If these gases are not 
properly vented, or a ventilator system breaks down, or a cooling system fails 
allowing gases to build up too rapidly, the tanks can explode.88 
A major tank explosion occurred in the Soviet Union in 1957 at the Mayak 
(meaning beacon or lighthouse) plutonium production facility. Mayak is lo-
cated near the southeastern edge of the Ural Mountains in a complex formerly 
known as Chelyabinsk-65, the oldest of three complexes the Soviet Union built 
for obtaining plutonium. In the 1957 accident, one tank exploded with an es-
timated force of 70100 metric tons of TNT, spewing out waste products with a 
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radioactivity of 20 million curies (for comparison purposes, the 1986 Cherno-
byl accident released 50 million curies according to the Soviet government). 
Radioactive fallout from the blast contaminated 15,000 to 23,000 square kilo-
meters of land. In the most radioactive zone, all the trees were killed or dam-
aged. Guards and cleanup crews were exposed to many times the maximum 
permitted radiation dose, and there are reports that a high percentage of the 
most heavily exposed died prematurely. Even today, 75 square miles remain 
uninhabitable.89 
The United States has experienced the possibility of a similar accident at 
two sites: Hanford, which was the first U.S. plutonium production site, and the 
Savannah River Site, which produced both plutonium and tritium. At Hanford, 
in Washington State, estimates suggest two dozen to four dozen high-level 
waste tanks are at risk of explosion or fire. Hydrogen gas buildup in one tank 
led to burping until special measures were taken to reduce hydrogen accu-
mulation. At the Savannah River Site in South Carolina there are two docu-
mented cases of hydrogen buildups in HLW tanks above the lowest threshold 
for a possible explosion.90 
Similar near misses have also occurred in France and Britain. Frances main 
plutonium reprocessing facility is located at La Hague, in northwest France 
along the English Channel. This facility has experienced at least two serious 
power outages. La Hague, however, relies on electricity to maintain cooling of 
its HLW tanks, and a power failure of just three to twelve hours, it is estimated, 
could cause the contents to overheat and explode. One might hope that the 
chances of such a catastrophic accident would decline over time. Because of 
human error, however, there will always be risks. This is demonstrated by a 
recent incident at the Sellafield complex, a site on Englands west coast not too 
far below Scotland, where the plutonium for Britains weapons was produced. 
In January 2001, workers monitoring HLW tanks there ignored for three hours 
 
89. Thomas B. Cochran and Robert S. Norris, A First Look at the Soviet Bomb Com-
plex, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 47, no. 4 (May 1991): 2628; Albert Donnay et al., Russia 
and the Territories of the Former Soviet Union, in Makhijani, Nuclear Wastelands, 33337, 
38889; Office of Environmental Management, U.S. Department of Energy, Closing the Circle 
on the Splitting of the Atom (Washington, D.C., January 1996), 77 [hereinafter, Closing the Circle]. 
This last report gives a lower estimate, of 510 tons, for the force of the explosion, but does 
not indicate its sources. The Mayak facility was also once known as Chelyabinsk-40. The 
explosion is sometimes referred to as the Kyshtym accident, as Kyshtym was the closest city 
listed on Soviet maps. 
90. Linda Rothstein, Nothing Clean about Cleanup, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 51, 
no. 3 (May/June 1995): 39; Arjun Makhijani et al., The United States, in Nuclear Wastelands, 
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alarms warning of a gas buildup, which could have led to the explosion of a 
tank containing 2,000 tons of highly radioactive waste.91 
Waste tanks containing red oil, a mix of uranium, plutonium and other 
radioactive substances in a complex chemical solution, can also explode if the 
contents are not stirred adequately. The United States has suffered four red oil 
explosions, most recently at Savannah River in 1975. A 1959 explosion at Oak 
Ridge, a complex in Tennessee that processed uranium and lithium for nuclear 
weapons, spread 600 milligrams of plutonium in the vicinity of the building 
where the explosion occurred. A more serious red oil explosion happened in 
April 1993 at Russias Tomsk-7 plutonium production complex in southern 
Siberia. This explosion spread radioactive contamination over 250 square kilo-
meters. Less than a kilometer from the closest village, the radiation reached 40 
times the natural background level.92 
Besides waste tank explosions, two other types of accidents have occurred 
in association with fissile materials production: fires and criticality incidents. 
Both plutonium and uranium can trigger both types of accident. First, in their 
metallic form, both plutonium and uranium are flammable when small chips or 
flecks of them are exposed to air. Hence, fires have been a recurring problem 
in nuclear weapons production. Literally hundreds of fires broke out at the 
Rocky Flats Plant in Colorado, which made the plutonium pits for U.S. nuclear 
weapons; several of these fires released radioactive contamination. In the larg-
est fire, in May 1969, only a lucky fluke saved the city of Denver, located six-
teen miles downwind of Rocky Flats, from being exposed to a major pluto-
nium release. The fire was drawn upward by large ventilator fans, until it nearly 
burned through the roof of the building. Disaster was averted only because a 
fire truck accidentally knocked over a power pole, cutting off electricity to the 
fans. Nevertheless, in fighting the fire, forty-one firefighters and plant workers 
sustained radiation doses.93 
Fires and explosions can occur for other reasons as well. Great Britains Sel-
lafield site (known as Windscale at the time) experienced a serious fire in Oc-
tober 1957. The plutonium production reactors at Sellafield were graphite 
moderated, and graphite, because it is carbon-based, can catch fire if heating is 
 
91. Donnay and Kuster, France, 474; Terje Langeland, Here, There, Everywhere, Bul-
letin of the Atomic Scientists 57, no. 6 (November/December 2001): 6364. Nowadays, most of 
the work at both La Hague and Sellafield is for the civilian sector, but both sites also do 
reprocessing for their countries nuclear weapons programs. 
92. Makhijani et al., The United States, 233; Donnay et al., Russia, 35860. 
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not properly controlled; this is apparently what happened in 1957. The fire 
caused two major releases of radioactivity. Studies estimate that the doses re-
ceived by the public could have caused hundreds of thyroid cancer cases, in-
cluding up to 100 fatal cancers.94 Because graphite is considered the preferred 
moderator for plutonium production, new states that seek to develop a source 
of military plutonium will likely experience similar fire risks. 
Fissile materials production can also lead to an accidental criticality. A criti-
cality occurs when enough fissile material (which can be as little as half a kilo-
gram) is brought together in a small enough space to trigger a chain reaction. 
Accidental criticalities will not cause a nuclear explosion, but will produce in-
tense radiation for as long as the nuclear reaction continues. One study identi-
fied a total of nine criticality accidents in the United States since 1945; re-
markably, eight of these took place in the nuclear weapons complex and only 
one in the civilian sector. Four people died within days of these accidents due 
to radiation exposure.95 People who worked at the Mayak plant in the former 
Soviet Union remember four criticality accidents between 1957 and 1968. They 
report that all but one of those exposed in the accidents died as a result.96 
The Israeli Atomic Energy Commission has acknowledged that an acciden-
tal criticality in December 1966 killed one person and injured three others at 
the Dimona complex in the Negev Desert where Israel does most of its nu-
clear weapons work. Other reports claim that several scientists have been killed 
by plutonium-related accidents at Dimona. The Israeli experience also suggests 
that further problems can arise if weapons production goals lead a country to 
continuing operating an aging reactor beyond its normal lifetime. A former 
Dimona scientist claims the reactor there is past the usual decommissioning 
age and has become unsafe as a result.97 
Even the Chinese government, despite its penchant for secrecy, has ac-
knowledged accidents. One official published an article that said ten people 
were exposed to radiation in a serious accident during the Cultural Revolution 
at an unnamed production reactor in northwest China (probably Jiuquan, 
which is the main plutonium production site in that area). Another official re-
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(September/October 1999): 27. 
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port said careless handling of radioactive materials led to accidents that killed 
twenty people and injured 1,200 between 1980 and 1985. A government-
sponsored newspaper also reported a 1988 accident that exposed fifteen peo-
ple to radiation.98 
Dangerous accidents can also occur, and indeed have occurred, after nuclear 
weapons have been assembled. For example, warheads contain chemical high 
explosive, which is used to compress the fissile materials into a critical mass. If 
part of this explosive is accidentally detonated, it can break open the warhead 
and disperse its radioactive contents, exposing people in the surrounding area 
to radiation.99 
Such incidents can also have implications for stability, the traditional focus 
of the proliferation debate. In fact, Sagan has analyzed how an accident that 
caused a warhead to break open and disperse radioactivity could falsely be 
taken as an indication of nuclear attack and trigger a decision to launch nuclear 
weapons.100 This section has shown that accidents can have quite negative ef-
fects even if they do not undermine stability. At the same time, once environ-
mental consequences are considered seriously in their own right, fuller exami-
nation reveals that there are many possible accidents besides a warhead break-
ing open that could generate an explosion or radiation release that could be 
mistaken for evidence of an enemy attack. 
HEALTH CONSEQUENCES FOR WORKERS 
Even if no major accidents occur, workers at nuclear weapons plants cannot 
entirely avoid exposure to hazardous materials. Estimating the consequences 
for either employees or nearby residents is extremely difficult, however. Avail-
able raw data have significant gaps because nuclear weapons facilities did not 
always monitor releases of harmful substances or worker exposures to radia-
tion, and when they did they often kept poor records or simply kept their data 
secret. In addition, there is still significant disagreement about the impact of 
exposure to low levels of radiation. As a result, there is no way to estimate with 
confidence any precise figure for the number of people killed or made sick by 
exposures resulting from nuclear weapons production. 
Reflecting this uncertainty, studies to date of the possible health conse-
quences have produced conflicting findings. The trend, however, has been 
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toward increasing evidence of certain negative health impacts. In 1999, after a 
thorough review of the existing studies, the U.S. government officially acknowl-
edged that workers in the U.S. nuclear weapons complex had been harmed by 
exposure to radioactive and toxic substances. The study concluded that em-
ployees from fourteen facilities had elevated cancer rates and that they suffered 
from greater than expected rates of twenty-two categories of disease. As a re-
sult, Congress the next year approved legislation to compensate workers 
whose health had been affected and the families of workers who had died as a 
result. The Department of Energy (DOE), which has responsibility for the nu-
clear weapons complex, estimated that 3,000 cases would qualify for compen-
sation: about one half for cancer and another one quarter for beryllium disease. 
Nongovernmental experts, however, believe the governments estimate is too 
low and that examination of a wider range of illnesses would reveal that thou-
sands more workers suffered adverse health effects.101 
Meta-analyses of the combined data from multiple nuclear weapons facilities 
tend to support the conclusion of an increased cancer risk. The evidence is 
strongest for elevated rates of leukemia and brain cancer, but higher than ex-
pected rates of all forms of cancer appear in the data. Separate studies in the 
United Kingdom found an increase in leukemia rates associated with greater 
exposure to radiation among nuclear weapons workers, and greater than ex-
pected death rates from prostate and renal cancers at certain facilities.102 
On the other side of the ledger, nuclear weapons work also created jobs for 
individuals who might not otherwise have been able to find an equivalent 
source of income. In the former Soviet Union, for example, nuclear weapons 
workers enjoyed more amenities than the typical Soviet citizen. In many cases, 
nearby towns also achieved a higher standard of living because of the money 
nuclear weapons facilities injected into the local economy.103 If the govern-
ments concerned had viewed creating employment or economic growth as an 
objective, however, they could have invested the vast sums of money spent on 
nuclear weapons in other activities. In this way, they might have been able to 
generate at least as many jobs, in less hazardous lines of work. 
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OFF-SITE CONTAMINATION PROBLEMS 
Nuclear weapons production not only creates hazards for workers but also 
endangers people (and other living things) beyond site boundaries. There are 
three basic sources of risk: major accidents, intentional releases of hazardous 
materials, and inadvertent contamination. Since the risk of major accidents has 
already been discussed, this subsection will summarize the most likely and sig-
nificant risks from the other two sources. Some practices and technologies 
from the early years of the nuclear age that involved large radiation releases can 
be avoided by new nuclear states if they choose and so will not be included 
here as anticipated consequences of proliferation.104 Some intentional dis-
charges into the air or nearby bodies of water, however, are still likely as a way 
to prevent contaminants from accumulating in dangerous concentrations in-
side nuclear weapon production sites, and these will necessarily release con-
taminants off site. 
In addition, various operations also tend to cause on-site contamination, 
which can affect every element of the environment. According to the DOE, 
Every site in the [U.S. nuclear weapons] complex is contaminated to some 
extent with radioactive or other hazardous materials. This contamination oc-
curs not only in buildings; it is also found in soil, air, ground water, and surface 
water at the sites.105 A 1994 French survey similarly determined that many 
sites in that countrys nuclear weapons complex are contaminated.106 Some of 
this contamination is also likely to migrate off site. 
Britains Sellafield complex illustrates how intentional and inadvertent re-
leases can combine to produce problems. Sellafield deliberately discharged 
some wastes into the nearby Irish Sea in the belief that the sea would disperse 
and dilute the radiation. Other contamination arose unintentionally, because 
wastes stored in ponds on site washed out to sea and radioactive liquids leaked 
from buildings used to store fuel cladding.107 
These releases are strongly suspected of causing major health problems. In 
the village of Seascale, near Sellafield, the leukemia rate is ten times the na-
tional average (because researchers disagree about the cause, this cluster can-
not be definitively attributed to Sellafield). Some radiation researchers have 
estimated that Sellafields emissions will over the lifetime of the radioactivity 
lead to 200 excess cancer deaths for each year the emissions remain at their 
 
104. Details of the most egregious examples can be found in Makhijani et al., Nuclear 
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current level. Besides the Seascale cluster, leukemia clusters have developed 
near other nuclear weapons production sites in Europe. U.K. researchers have 
identified a cluster in the Reading area, a location near both the Aldermaston 
weapons lab and the Burghfield plant, which did the final assembly and disas-
sembly of Britains nuclear bombs. Researchers in France also found elevated 
leukemia rates in the vicinity of the La Hague reprocessing plant. They found 
that leukemia is most likely among children who went regularly to local 
beaches or who ate local seafood. Because radioactivity accumulates in greater 
concentrations in fish and shellfish than in the surrounding water, those who 
consume fish from contaminated portions of rivers or the sea will be at greater 
risk.108 
Plutonium production and reprocessing, as at Sellafield and La Hague, cre-
ate the greatest radioactive contamination problems. Even if countries eschew 
the plutonium path to the bomb, however, they will still have to engage in 
other production processes that can produce significant contamination. In the 
United States, the Fernald Plant in southwestern Ohio processed uranium for 
use in enrichment as well as in production reactors. In its work with uranium 
metal, Fernald emitted about 300 metric tons of uranium dust into the air. 
Uranium from Fernald also contaminated the drinking-water wells of nearby 
residents. Radon-222 gas releases from on-site waste storage tanks were also 
sufficient to create a risk of lung cancer among those most exposed compara-
ble to that produced by smoking cigarettes.109 
Nonradioactive toxic substances have also been routinely discharged into 
the environment. For example, Oak Ridge released an estimated 1,000 tons of 
mercury, which was used in lithium separation. Much of this was discharged 
into a nearby creek, and mercury concentrations well above EPA limits have 
been discovered in a nearby pond. Creek waters that feed into the Clinch River 
are also contaminated with radioactive cesium-137 and strontium-90 as well as 
PCBs from Oak Ridge.110 
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Even when production complexes attempt to contain or dispose of wastes 
on site, such efforts are often unsuccessful, due to leaks, spills or faulty calcula-
tions of how well a disposal method will work. Such miscalculations can open 
the door to especially disastrous developments, as the Soviet experience illus-
trates. In the early years of plutonium production at its Mayak plant, the Chely-
abinsk-65 complex actually dumped the wastes from Mayak directly into the 
Techa River, but stopped in the 1950s after the radioactive contamination this 
produced forced the evacuation of many downstream villages. Since, one 
hopes, no new nuclear state will simply dump its most radioactive wastes into a 
river, what happened subsequently, after Mayak began trying to manage its 
wastes, is more relevant to determining the possible consequences of future 
proliferation. Although it stored most HLW in tanks (one of which exploded in 
the 1957 accident described above, itself a tragic example of one of the greatest 
environmental risks), Mayak diverted medium-level wastes into nearby Lake 
Karachay, an enclosed body of water with no outlets. After an unusually dry 
winter and spring, strong winds in April and May 1967 blew radioactive dust 
from dried-out portions of the lakebed over a wide area. Reports of the radio-
activity released and territory affected vary greatly, but an intermediate estimate 
used by a U.S. government official suggests the wind dispersed 600,000 curies 
over 2,700 square kilometers. By the early 1990s, because of the cumulative 
waste discharged into it, one portion of Lake Karachay had become so radio-
active that a person standing at the lakes edge would receive a lethal dose in 
less than one hour.111 
Visitors to the region have reported that the Chelyabinsk Childrens Hospi-
tal has a complete ward devoted to leukemia cases, and studies in the early 
1990s found elevated rates of thyroid cancer and other diseases in the area 
around Mayak that they attributed to radiation releases. In an eerie symbol of 
the continuing danger of major radiation releases, in the town of Kyshtym, 
fifteen kilometers west of Mayak, a digital sign flashes not only the time and 
temperature, but the current radiation level as well.112 
 
111. Donnay et al. Russia, 32633; Commissioner Greta Joy Dicus, U.S. Nuclear Regu-
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mental Future, chap. 4, To the Nuclear Lighthouse, http://www.whistleblower.org/www/ 
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Waste management practices at other Soviet plutonium-production sites re-
veal other potential contamination risks. Starting in the 1960s, both Tomsk-7 
and Krasnoyarsk-26 began injecting most of their high-level waste deep under-
ground, hoping to contain it in or between layers of clay and sand found under 
the sites. This has led to groundwater contamination that could migrate to 
nearby rivers and sources of drinking water. At Tomsk-7, the wastes were de-
posited at a depth that may be within fifty meters of groundwater that supplies 
water for the city of Tomsk; the site is also about ten to twelve kilometers 
from the Tom River. Moreover, the rock in this area is very wet, which in-
creases the chances of migration of waste materials. Some Russian scientists 
and officials claim the sites geology will safely contain the waste materials, but 
there are also reports that village wells seven to fourteen kilometers away have 
already been contaminated by radionuclides. At Krasnoyarsk-26, wastes were 
injected in a terrace one-hundred meters above and just seven-hundred-and-
fifty meters from the Yenesei River. Studies have found localized contamina-
tion and migration into groundwater here as well, though again officials claim 
the migration will not be rapid enough to pose a risk.113 
Many U.S. sites have experienced similar difficulties confining wastes placed 
in on-site repositories. At Hanford, sixty-seven HLW storage tanks are con-
firmed or suspected to have leaked. The government believes at least 750,000 
gallons of highly radioactive waste got into the soil as a result. Some of this 
waste has reached the water table, and the DOE estimates it will migrate to the 
nearby Columbia River within about twenty years.114 The DOE has also ex-
pressed great concern about water contamination risks at the Pantex plant, 
near Amarillo, Texas, which has been responsible for final assembly and disas-
sembly of U.S. nuclear weapons. Pantex is only one-hundred-and-fifty meters 
above the Ogallala Aquifer, the largest and most heavily used aquifer in the 
United States. Until 1980, Pantex dumped its chemical wastes in unlined pits, 
creating a danger that toxics will migrate into groundwater.115 The contractor 
that operated the Savannah River Site has acknowledged that groundwater 
there is contaminated with plutonium. Environmental scientists have ex-
pressed concern that the plutonium and other contaminants will migrate into 
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the Tuscaloosa Aquifer, a source of drinking water for Alabama, Georgia, and 
the Carolinas.116 
Some off-site contamination risks are truly surreal. Workers at Hanford 
regularly collect and bury what they call hot tumbleweeds, which grow in the 
contaminated soil at the site. One reason there is concern about vegetation in 
contaminated areas is that it would release radioactivity if burned in a fire. 
Events in 2000 demonstrated that this concern is not farfetched. In May a fire 
that had been set to clear brush burned out of control and threatened the Los 
Alamos National Laboratory. Then, in late June, an auto accident triggered a 
fire that swept across half of the Hanford Nuclear Reservation. Both fires led 
to slight releases of radioactivity, much of it attributed to the burning of con-
taminated vegetation, though the radiation in both cases remained below levels 
officials consider hazardous to health. Both fires also threatened buildings or 
storage sites containing much greater levels of radioactivity, and major releases 
were averted mainly due to favorable changes in the wind.117 
The primary concern in this section is the health harm that can arise from 
nuclear weapons production, but it is worth noting that the environmental 
consequences also add substantially to the economic costs of becoming a nu-
clear state. In 1995, the Energy Department estimated that a comprehensive 
cleanup of the U.S. nuclear weapons complex would cost $500 billion; others 
have estimated that it will require $1 trillion. If the United States decides not to 
clean up the sites, it will still have to spend about $200 billion over seventy-five 
years to stabilize the sites so as to limit future off-site migration of contami-
nants.118 The Congressional Budget Office has estimated that compensating 
workers or their families for illnesses linked to weapons work will cost a fur-
ther $2 billion in the programs first decade.119 In the end, dealing with the 
environmental and health consequences of a nuclear weapons program could 
cost a country as much money as building its arsenal in the first place. 
This shows it is important to consider possible linkages between different 
types of consequences, such as economic and environmental. In addition, 
there can also be unfortunate interaction effects within a category. For 
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example, if environmental contamination must be cleaned up to avoid a threat 
to public health, the cleanup effort can create a new set of accidents and health 
hazards. Workers at Oak Ridge have charged that waste incineration there trig-
gered a spate of unusual illnesses, while accidents during cleanup at Oak Ridge 
have created new exposures to hazardous materials as well as new contamina-
tion problems. Cleanup work at Hanford even exposed eleven workers to in-
ternal doses of plutonium, although the exposures were within regulatory lim-
its.120 
NEW NUCLEAR STATES UNLIKELY TO AVOID PROBLEMS 
How likely is it that the harms outlined above will be replicated by future nu-
clear weapon states? Compared to weapon states of the first generation, future 
proliferants could benefit from greater awareness of the dangers of radiation, 
newer technology, and learning from the first generations experiences. For 
reasons given above, however, I have argued that there are limits to how effec-
tive learning can be in reducing the hazards, and empirical evidence bears this 
out. Two sets of evidence, in fact, suggest that future programs are unlikely to 
be less harmful than past nuclear weapons efforts. First, even the states with 
the most advanced technology and greatest democratic accountability still ex-
perience accidents and sometimes disregard safety or environmental concerns. 
Second, the limited data available from the most recent aspiring proliferants 
also indicate serious health and environmental risks. 
On the first point, the United States, Great Britain and France all still have 
recurring problems in their nuclear weapons complexes. In the United States, 
for example, Hanford during its final years of operation committed 17 viola-
tions of rules designed to prevent accidental criticalities. A DOE investigation 
discovered that in some cases supervisors had even told workers to ignore 
these rules.121 In France, a discharge pipe from the La Hague reprocessing 
plant was releasing radioactive waste into the ocean near a public beach until at 
least June 2000.122 In 1999, the U.K.s Aldermaston plant admitted it had for 
two years illegally discharged radioactive waste (containing tritium) into a 
stream that feeds the Thames. The previous year, a safety audit of the plant 
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revealed three serious safety violations, including one instance of failing to 
follow criticality clearance procedures.123 Even more seriously, as noted 
above, there was nearly an HLW tank explosion at Sellafield in early 2001. If 
even the most experienced, technologically advanced and democratic nuclear 
weapon states still cannot achieve a clean safety and environmental record, one 
cannot expect newcomers to the nuclear club to do any better. 
In fact, serious problems are likely. Many of the more recent nuclear acquisi-
tion efforts have occurred in countries that have troubled economies, less 
modern technology, and unstable or authoritarian governments. It is unlikely 
that workers or the public in these countries will be well protected against the 
hazards of nuclear weapons production. 
Iraq offers a stark example of how weak efforts to safeguard workers health 
may be in new nuclear states. According to Peter Zimmerman, even by Man-
hattan Project standards their precautions were primitive and inadequate to 
protect the majority of workers. David Kay, who led some of the first inter-
national inspections of Iraq after the 1991 Gulf War, has reported that some 
American inspectors initially did not believe that nuclear weapons work had 
gone on at certain sites because the facilities could never have met U.S. Occu-
pational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) standards for handling ra-
dioactive materials. While Kay tells the anecdote to make fun of the naïveté of 
some U.S. scientists, the story also gives some indication of just how bad condi-
tions must have been for those working on Iraqs nuclear weapons program.124 
Iraq also illustrates how stability considerations can interact with health and 
environmental issues. After Iraqs invasion of Kuwait, Saddam Hussein or-
dered an all-out effort to try to complete a nuclear device before the United 
States and its allies could initiate use of force against Iraq. To produce needed 
material, the Iraqis ran one of their reactors nonstop for so long it irradiated 
the plant and workers there became ill with radiation sickness.125 If a states 
progress toward a nuclear capability does not lead to stability, or even encour-
ages aggression by that state, then the pressures of expected conflict can exac-
erbate the other negative consequences of proliferation. 
 
123. Charles Arthur, Nuclear Waste Fed into Thames Stream, Independent, 14 December 
1999, http://www.independent.co.uk/news/UK/Environment/nuclear141299.shtml; An-
drew Gilligan and Rob Evans, Aldermaston Report Reveals String of Alerts over Safety, 
Daily Telegraph, 21 February 1999, http://www.telegraph.co.uk. 
124. Peter D. Zimmerman, Technical Barriers to Nuclear Proliferation, Security Studies 2, 
nos. 3/4 (spring/summer 1993): 348; David Kay, Iraqi Inspections: Lessons Learned (talk 
given at the Monterey Institute of International Studies, 10 February 1993, reprinted in Eye 
on Supply, issue 8 (winter 1993), http://cns.miis.edu/db/archives/nuc/eos/kay.htm. 









































SECURITY STUDIES 12, no. 1 (autumn 2002): 86 
North Korea has also experienced significant environmental and safety 
problems in its main nuclear complex at Yongbyon. When they selected the 
site, planners failed to account for the maximum height reached by the nearby 
Kuryong River during the late summer rainy season. As a result, basement 
rooms in the complex have repeatedly been flooded. In fall 1995 basements of 
the critical assembly and nuclear fuel storage facilities in one part of the com-
plex were completely flooded. International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) 
inspectors and other observers have expressed concern about the potential for 
accidents at the site and about the physical security of its nuclear materials. 
IAEA officials have also indicated that North Koreas radiation shielding sys-
tems are inferior to those of the advanced countries. In addition, North Ko-
rea lacked the ability to prevent the corrosion of spent fuel from its graphite-
moderated reactor (the reactor from which the IAEA suspected plutonium had 
been diverted). Considerable contamination could have resulted; it was pre-
vented only because fear that North Korea might remove and possibly reproc-
ess the spent fuel led the U.S. government to send a team of nuclear engineers 
to put the spent fuel in canisters that would prevent corrosion.126 
Isolated, authoritarian states are not the only recent aspirants to nuclear 
weapon status to experience serious problems. Although India is democratic 
and can draw on a greater base of scientific expertise, its safety record is not 
encouraging. Indias dedicated nuclear weapons facilities are located in Trom-
bay (just north of Bombay) at the Bhabha Atomic Research Center (BARC). 
India also has a number of primarily civilian facilities that supply materials to 
its military program. 
Journalistic exposés have suggested a wide range of ongoing safety and envi-
ronmental problems. A 1979 article reported that there had been two explo-
sions at the Baroda heavy water plant, as well as a major fire and pollution of 
well water at the uranium processing and fuel fabrication plant in Hyderabad. 
A more recent investigation charges that more than fifty workers involved in 
dumping wastes from Hyderabad into storage ponds died in a four-year period 
in the 1990s because of their radiation intake. Outside investigators also say 
there is evidence that excess radiation exposure among people living near In-
dias nuclear facilities has led to abnormally high rates of cancer, birth defects, 
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and infertility, especially in villages near plants where accidents have oc-
curred.127 
Nuclear plants that have a larger civilian than military role are not the only 
ones with a poor safety record. Indias nuclear weapons complex appears to 
function no better. For example, in 1991 BARC operated its Dhruva plutonium-
production reactor for almost a month with a malfunctioning emergency cool-
ing system. In 1995, an accident started draining water from a fuel-rod storage 
pond, nearly exposing the radioactive fuel rods to air. Multiple leaks in under-
ground pipelines at BARC have also contaminated a large volume of subsoil 
with radioactive liquid waste.128 
Breaking with a tradition of minimal oversight, in 1995 the then-chairperson 
of the Atomic Energy Regulatory Board (AERB), Adinarayana Gopalakrishnan, 
initiated a comprehensive review of safety at Indias nuclear installations. Al-
though the Indian government used official secrecy laws to prevent public re-
lease of his report, Gopalakrishnan later told the press about its general find-
ings. Speaking about certain facilities at BARC, he said their degraded safety 
status and continued operation without substantial repairs have been causing 
serious concerns within the AERB from the standpoint of worker and public 
safety. Despite these concerns, in April 2000, the Indian government re-
moved BARC from further AERB oversight, raising further concerns that safety 
standards would not be adequately enforced.129 
One other small incident symbolizes how governments come to accept 
harm to local communities in order to move forward in nuclear weapons de-
velopment. Indias Pokaran test site is located in a desert, where about 20,000 
people live in nearby villages. The desert residents depend on stored water, and 
sometimes pay more for their water tanks than for their homes. When India 
tested nuclear weapons in May 1998, the tests cracked a number of these water 
tanks, putting at risk the water supply for local villagers.130 
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PSYCHOLOGICAL CONSEQUENCES 
Nuclear weapons gain their deterrent effect by creating a risk of enormous 
destruction; they can also be potent symbols of military power. For these rea-
sons, they may have significant effects, either positive or negative, on peoples 
psyches in countries that develop nuclear weapons. Because security is partly 
subjectivea question of whether or not one feels safethe possible benefits 
of nuclear weapons would be reduced if they create feelings of insecurity, and 
vice versa. Psychological impacts could also affect the net utility of nuclear 
weapons for a society in other ways. 
On the positive side, nuclear weapons may create feelings of national pride, 
as signs of scientific accomplishment and a means to stand up to outside pow-
ers. After Indias first nuclear test, in 1974, a public opinion poll found that 90 
percent of those who knew of the test were personally proud of this achieve-
ment.131 Following the May 1998 tests, people gathered near the prime min-
isters residence, where they danced in the streets and shouted Victory to 
Mother India!132 
In countries that have lived with the mutual threat of annihilation for some 
time, however, psychological research shows that there are also negative im-
pacts. A series of studies in the late 1970s and early 1980s examined the psy-
chological effects on children and adolescents of living with the possibility of 
nuclear war. These studies produced consistently similar findings; although 
most were conducted in the United States, a small number conducted in the 
Soviet Union and others in Europe corroborated the U.S. findings.133 The stud-
ies found awareness of the possibility of nuclear war in children as young as 
five or six years old. The overriding response produced in children was fear for 
the future. Many children also expressed feelings of powerlessness, leading 
them to conclude that participating in the political arena would not be worth-
while. In some, their fears also made them unwilling to make long-range plans, 
out of a belief they might not survive to enjoy the benefits. 
This psychological unease can continue into adulthood. Research in the 
1970s on Americans who had experienced air raid drills as children found that 
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all of them had occasional nightmares about nuclear war.134 The psychologist 
Robert Jay Lifton argued that awareness of the bomb had become to some 
extent always present in peoples minds, potentially coloring every aspect of 
their lives. Controversially, Lifton claimed that Americans were suffering from 
psychic numbing: because people can no longer be certain that any of their 
works will last or that their descendants will survive into the future, and be-
cause worrying constantly about nuclear war would be overwhelming, people 
had to numb some of their ability to feel in general.135 Even if one does not 
accept Liftons thesis in toto, it seems reasonable to expect that a loss of cer-
tainty about the existence of a human future would be emotionally unsettling. 
On the other hand, people could also experience fear if a potential adversary 
had nuclear weapons but their own state did not. Because nuclear weapons 
have dualistic implications, as discussed above, the psychological effects could 
similarly run in opposite directions. Hence, while some people have night-
mares or numb their feelings because they fear nuclear war, others might feel 
more secure because they believe nuclear deterrence provides a guarantee of 
security their country could not achieve through any other means.136 
Finally, the psychological effects on society can have negative implications 
for the stability of deterrence. The mix of fear and nationalism aroused by a 
demonstrated nuclear capability tends to work against the caution that opti-
mists expect nuclear weapons to produce. Praful Bidwai is the leading journal-
istic critic of Indias nuclear weapons program. Two years after the 1998 test 
series, he observed: Today, instead of sobriety, we have unprecedented ex-
changes of hostile rhetoric and heightening of tensions. The number of Indi-
ans who believe that Pakistans destruction is a prerequisite for peace in this 
region (and vice versa) has never been greater. Bidwai contends that the re-
vival in both countries of national prejudices against the other side has been 
one of the main costs of their declarations of nuclear weapon status.137 If the 
public develops a more negative image of the other side at the same time it 
becomes more confident in its own countrys strength, this is a recipe for reck-
lessness, not caution. 
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DOMESTIC POLITICAL CONSEQUENCES 
Security for a state involves protecting the states territory, the lives of its citi-
zens, and the national institutions that are highly valued as part of the states 
identity.138 In democracies, preserving the democratic political system (and 
associated personal freedoms) is usually one of the states goals. To the extent 
nuclear deterrence helps to protect freedom and democracy, its domestic po-
litical consequences will be seen as positive. 
Nuclear weapons programs, however, can also have other consequences for 
the vitality of democratic institutions. Such programs tend to short-circuit 
normal mechanisms for ensuring debate, oversight, or accountability. Histori-
cally, decisions to initiate a nuclear weapons program have been made in secret 
by a very small inner circle of leaders.139 Thus, even if a majority of a states 
citizens might have voted not to develop a nuclear arsenal, they are never 
given a chance to register this preference in advance. In addition, neither the 
citizens nor the legislature in even the most democratic nuclear weapon states 
have been given much scope for input into questions of nuclear doctrine that 
could determine when and how a nuclear war is fought, even though such de-
cisions literally involve the highest imaginable stakes: the survival of the coun-
try and its people.140 
These problems are accentuated in opaque proliferators, which, in order not 
to provoke a strong international reaction, seek to keep the existence of their 
program either covert or at most ambiguous. In such countries, no aspect of 
the program, not even whether to keep a nuclear arsenal, can be debated pub-
licly. As a result, even in democratic Israel, any publication on the nuclear issue 
is subject to strict military censorship. As Cohen and Frankel put it, Opacity 
thus depends on a continuous voluntary subversion of democratic institu-
tions.141 
Concerns about preserving secrecy can also prompt harsh reactions by the 
state, with negative impacts on personal freedom and human rights. This is 
again especially true in opaque proliferators. In such countries, anyone who 
reveals details about the program, even if his or her goal is to permit public 
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debate rather than to assist some other country, may face a severe legal re-
sponse. In October 1986 Mordechai Vanunu, a nuclear technician, gave infor-
mation about Israels nuclear program to Londons Sunday Times. Israeli agents 
subsequently kidnapped Vanunu in Italy and brought him back to Israel, where 
he was tried behind closed doors and sentenced to 18 years in solitary con-
finement for disclosing state secrets. 
The handling of the Wen Ho Lee case in the United States also raises trou-
bling questions. The case is different from Vanunus in an important way: Lee, 
a scientist at the Los Alamos National Lab, was suspected of providing secret 
weapon design information to a rival government, which if true would be a 
real and undesirable case of espionage. The governments case, however, 
crumbled spectacularly. After charging Lee on fifty-nine counts, the govern-
ment accepted a guilty plea on just one count, which did not involve giving 
away secrets, and it released Lee for time served. If the governments case was 
actually as weak as this outcome suggests, then the United States treated Lee 
unfairly in two respects. First, after his arrest, Lee was kept in solitary con-
finement, under relatively harsh conditions, for nine months. Second, because 
the investigation began after a discovery that China had obtained U.S. secrets, 
investigators assumed any spy would be ethnically Chinese, meaning Lee be-
came a target at least in part because of his racial background.142 Lees unusu-
ally harsh treatment before he went to trial and the racial prejudices that allega-
tions of Chinese espionage apparently aroused both suggest that fears about 
losing nuclear secrets can prompt law enforcement practices that would not 
otherwise be considered acceptable in a democracy. 
Legitimate concerns about nuclear secrecy can also become a shield behind 
which to hide other undesirable practices. In countries that do not create sepa-
rate military and civilian nuclear installations, laws to protect military secrets 
are easily stretched to protect the civilian nuclear sector from scrutiny. For 
example, Indias Department of Atomic Energy has on numerous occasions 
invoked the Official Secrets Act and Atomic Energy Act to prevent the public 
release of information about performance failures and safety problems in the 
countrys extensive civil nuclear program.143 This is yet another example of 
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how different types of consequences can interact in ways that further increase 
the negative impacts. In this case, a limitation on democratic oversight arising 
from a nuclear arms program can add to the health and environmental prob-
lems a country will experience. 
The incentives for nuclear secrecy can also be a force working against the 
establishment of democratic practices in countries undergoing transitions away 
from autocracy. In the 1990s, Russia arrested a number of individuals who 
provided information about or protested against Russias nuclear activities. 
Probably the most ominous cases involved the nuclear-powered naval fleet 
rather than nuclear weapons, but they illustrate what states are willing to do to 
shield military nuclear activities from scrutiny. In separate cases, two former 
naval officers were charged with treason for helping foreign groups investigate 
ocean dumping of nuclear waste by the Russian Navy. The conviction of one 
individual was eventually overturned on appeal, but the Supreme Court upheld 
a sentence of four years in a labor camp in the second case. In both cases, the 
Federal Security Service, the successor agency to the Soviet KGB, made the 
arrests. This suggests that the mission to preserve nuclear secrets can become a 
pretext for a former secret police organization to maintain a role for itself in a 
democratizing society.144 
In a weakly institutionalized democracy, the consequences of crossing the 
nuclear threshold can even indirectly help topple democracy itself. The chief 
example is Pakistan, where the open demonstration of nuclear weapons capa-
bility helped set the stage for the military overthrow of its democratically 
elected government in October 1999. The majority of Pakistanis initially toler-
ated the coup by General Pervez Musharraf because of the widespread corrup-
tion attributed to the ousted prime minister, Nawaz Sharif. While this govern-
ment corruption had no relation to nuclear weapons, the events that led to 
Sharifs ouster flowed directly from Pakistans nuclear tests in 1998. Based on a 
belief that the stability-instability paradox would preclude a forceful Indian 
response, after the tests the army, under Musharrafs leadership, increased its 
involvement in the disputed Kashmir region, leading to the Kargil conflict. 
When Sharif gave in to U.S. pressure to withdraw Pakistani forces, opposition 
parties and much of the public and the military saw this decision as a humiliat-
ing cave-in. To deflect criticism, Sharif attempted to blame the military for the 
Kargil debacle and to remove certain military leaders from office. These ac-
tions then triggered the coup. Thus, in Pakistan, one can plausibly argue that 
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democratic government itself became a casualty of the nuclear weapons pro-
gram.145 
The Pakistani coup also shows once more how looking at a broader range 
of consequences of nuclear proliferation can add relevant information to the 
traditional focus of the debate, the prospects for stability. Because Indian offi-
cials perceive the Pakistani military as one of the most hardline anti-India ele-
ments in Pakistan, the coup led New Delhi to see less scope for conflict reso-
lution and a greater need for hardline policies of its own. Although this was 
not the only factor involved, this perception contributed to Indias willingness 
to threaten war following the attack on its parliament in December 2001. By 
weakening Pakistani democracy, nuclear weapons thus helped remove one of 
the sources of moderation on the subcontinent. The impacts of nuclear weap-
ons on a countrys economy and domestic political system are worth consider-
ing in their own right, but broadening the proliferation debate to examine such 
factors can also strengthen the analysis of proliferations implications for re-
gional stability. 
ARE SMALL ARSENALS BEST? 
The consequences of nuclear weapons for other concerns besides stability turn 
out, on balance, to be negative, from which I conclude that broadening the 
debate to consider these other impacts strengthens the pessimist case. In con-
trast, one reviewer of this article suggested that the analysis presented here 
instead favors a conclusion that small nuclear arsenals are generally best. With 
small arsenals, states can gain whatever deterrent and stability benefits nuclear 
weapons provide, while minimizing the negative consequences highlighted 
above. 
This reasoning is faulty. It assumes that all costs are linear, so that costs are 
small when the arsenal is small and only grow large as weapons deployments 
increase. Many costs are not linear, however; they are fixed costs that must be 
paid to acquire an arsenal, regardless of size. For example, the startup costs for 
building an infrastructure for obtaining fissile materials, turning them into war-
heads, and producing delivery vehicles are the same no matter how many 
weapons a state churns out. The same holds true for research and develop-
ment costs. Similarly, once fissile materials production begins, a risk of 
catastrophic accident will exist, and some health harm to workers and envi-
ronmental contamination are almost inevitable. All these costs and risks rise 
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marginally as more weapons are produced, but they will still be substantial 
even if only one weapon is ever deployed. 
Other consequences are probably independent of arsenal size, or may even 
be made worse by small arsenals. The psychological impacts are basically exis-
tential: they will be present as long as the possibility of nuclear war exists. The 
stresses on democracy are also probably greatest with small arsenals. Because 
the survival of a small arsenal depends on keeping secret where weapons have 
been deployed, the limitations on public debate are likely to be more severe. If 
a state decides the reasons to seek a nuclear deterrent are overwhelming, the 
analysis here does provide additional arguments for preferring a small arsenal, 
but where the case for nuclear acquisition is not this clear-cut, then the various 
consequences discussed in the latter portion of this article only reinforce the 
pessimist argument that states are generally better off without nuclear weap-
ons. 
If a new state does decide to seek a nuclear capability, the broader focus 
proposed here is still policy relevant, because it makes clearer what states 
should do to minimize the negative consequences of a nuclear weapons pro-
gram. Probably the most valuable step a state could take would be to establish 
from the outset strong standards for workplace safety and waste disposal, 
backed up by vigorous oversight and strict accountability. For reasons given 
above however, it is unlikely that any state will actually do this. If a state be-
lieves it is urgent to respond to a security threat and to maintain secrecy, it will 
exempt a nuclear arms program from any regulations or oversight that might 
hamper its efforts to achieve a deterrent capability. 
ADVANTAGES OF RECASTING THE DEBATE 
HE ASSUMPTIONS underlying existing policies should never be taken for 
granted, and academics often perform a useful service when they question 
conventional wisdom. When Kenneth Waltz and other proliferation optimists 
challenged the widespread belief that the spread of nuclear weapons should be 
opposed, they forced nonproliferation advocates to clarify their own theoreti-
cal premises and they helped stimulate valuable new empirical research. The 
result has been an interesting debate with important policy implications. As an 
attempt to inform policy, however, the optimism-pessimism debate has been 
both misleading and incomplete. 
The debate has focused too much on which side has the better theory ac-
cording to standard social science superiority tests. Even if the realist and ra-
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powerful and accurate theory, this would not necessarily mean that nuclear 
proliferation is advisable. It is also important to evaluate the probability that 
predictions of stable deterrence might be wrong. For policy purposes, it makes 
a difference whether there is zero probability or instead a low but realistic risk 
of a disastrous outcome. 
Furthermore, there are good reasons to believe that the possibility of nu-
clear use cannot realistically be eliminated. I have argued that nuclear weapons 
are dualistic in nature, meaning nuclear proliferation will involve both poten-
tially stabilizing and potentially destabilizing results. In particular, one can de-
duce from the very logic of deterrence invoked by optimists certain ways in 
which nuclear acquisition tends to be provocative rather than caution inducing. 
Most worrisome, this logic suggests second-strike capabilities may not always 
be effective. If one side comes to believe that an attack by its adversary is im-
minent, it may strike first in hopes of achieving damage limitation even if it 
does not expect 100 percent success. 
The cross-cutting implications of nuclear weapons create a trade-off. As a 
result, there are potential risks in either acquiring or forgoing nuclear weapons, 
and the very existence of the optimism-pessimism debate proves that different 
individuals can weigh the trade-offs differently. Given that an evaluation of 
trade-offs is necessarily involved, it makes sense to consider other possible 
costs and benefits of nuclear weapons programs that might alter ones assess-
ment of which policy is preferable. 
To date, however, the debate has been surprisingly narrow, focusing almost 
exclusively on stability. Yet, nuclear weapons programs have economic, envi-
ronmental, and broader political costs and benefits that are also relevant to 
determining whether proliferation is desirable. On balance, the consequences 
in these other areas are negative, and although no one cost is likely to rival the 
harm done by a nuclear or major conventional war, cumulatively these costs 
can be quite significant. The environmental consequences are probably the 
most serious: the possible accidents and contamination associated with nuclear 
weapons production can lead to thousands of premature deaths. 
The clarifications and extensions of the proliferation debate introduced in 
this article show that the pessimist case is really stronger than the way it has 
been formulated in some recent presentations. They do not necessarily justify a 
conclusion that nuclear proliferation is never advisable, however: depending 
on a states security situation and the other alternatives available, nuclear acqui-
sition may in a small number of cases still appear attractive. Such cases, how-
ever, will not be the general rule, meaning efforts to promote nonproliferation 
still have a valid role. The analysis here leads to two policy recommendations 
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other costs and risks of proliferation may help dissuade some potential prolif-
erators. If people in a state considering the nuclear option think that nuclear 
weapons are cheap and deterrence is fail-safe, or do not know that nuclear 
arms programs cause harm even if the weapons are never used in war, the in-
formation in this article can be used to disabuse them of such illusions. 
Efforts at education and persuasion, however, are unlikely to be effective in 
all cases. If a country feels insecure enough, it may find the potential benefits 
of nuclear deterrence too attractive to be convinced not to go nuclear by ex-
hortation alone. Such countries will need to see some alternative way to meet 
their security concerns. Thus, if the United States and the international com-
munity want to promote nonproliferation, they will have either to assist non-
nuclear-weapon states in meeting their security needs or to help them identify 
feasible alternative ways to achieve the benefits they associate with nuclear 
weapons. 
Proliferation optimists have identified some persuasive logic and evidence 
for believing that nuclear weapons can contribute to security and stability, but 
their analysis becomes misleading if it suggests that these are the only conse-
quences of nuclear weapons or that regional rivals can never find an alternative 
path to stability. With nuclear weapons, a state cannot get the good without 
the bad: a more stable deterrent balance might result, but there will also cer-
tainly be some harm to the states population even if there is no war, and some 
small but non-zero risk of nuclear war will be created. People must ultimately 
weigh the pros and cons for themselves, but in doing so they should consider 
information about all of the consequences of nuclear acquisition, including the 
many hidden costs that have so far received almost no attention in the prolif-
eration debate. 
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